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Abstract 
 
“NO KEY TO THE TANGLE”: 
HISTORY AND POETIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN LOUIS ZUKOFSKY’S “A” 
 
 
Griffin Rowe 
B.A., Florida State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson: Christopher Meade 
 
 
This thesis explores the question of poetry’s relationship with history. My 
inquiry is centered on the epic poem “A” (1974) by American author Louis 
Zukofsky, considering the ways in which Zukofsky reconceptualizes the role that the 
past – its events, people, art – plays in the construction of a modern poetic 
consciousness. The project is divided into two sequences: historical representation of 
movements “A”-22 and “A”-23 in the poem and historical engagement in movements 
“A”-21 and “A”-24. The first sequence is a survey of the ways in which Zukofsky 
recreates the last 6,000 years of history in a manner that resists linearity and narrative. 
I read his poetry alongside Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History” (1940) 
and Gilles Deleuze’s Essays Clinical and Critical (1997) in order to consider the 
extent to which Zukofsky problematizes historical and literary language, and their 
limits of communication and expression in the poetic-now. The second sequence 
focuses on the historical materials with which Zukofsky engages, primarily the 
 
 
 
iv 
Roman playwright Plautus, as well as Zukofsky’s own previous writing. I contend 
that Zukofsky method of participating with history in his work is a kind of creative 
engagement with the past, one that acknowledges history as a living thing and seeks 
to absorb it into the formation of a new poetics. This is a performance of escape- 
work, so that texts, through active historical participation, resist textual totality and 
begin to reconnect themselves to the world outside of their binding in order to work 
within our contemporary reality. 
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End of page, 
end of this 
 
company – wee 
notebook kept 
 
my mind in hand, 
Let the world stay 
 
open to me 
day after day, 
 
words to say, 
things to be. 
 
Robert Creeley, “The End” 
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Introduction 
 
“let me live here ever”: Louis Zukofsky’s Poetics of History 
 
The intersection of philosophy and history engenders a certain problem of reading. 
 
We often consider history as a record, a flawless, objective account of things that have come 
before. This information is meant to educate us on the manner of our arrival into the present 
moment and, like the cold, mathematical equation, justifies the outcomes of events that create 
the contemporary state of things without the opportunity or worse the necessity for doubt or 
reconsideration. But philosophy recognizes that things cannot be reduced to such basic 
components, that history is as much a product of conflicting ways of thinking. It has taught  
us that to read history is akin to reading any other text and necessitates a critical eye and 
skepticism towards the reductionism of grand, sweeping, and politically powerful historical 
narratives. This is not to say, however, that these narratives do not hold some influence 
regardless of their validity. 
The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche posed this issue in an essay in which he 
describes the pressure of the historical on the contemporary individual through the allegory 
of looking at an animal: 
[the human] also wondered about himself and how he was unable to learn to forget 
and always clung to what was past; no matter how far or how fast he runs, that chain 
runs with him. It is a cause for wonder: the moment, here in a flash, gone in a flash, 
before it nothing, after it nothing, does, after all, return as a ghost once more and 
disturb the peace of a later moment. 
(“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life,” 126) 
This is a haunting that is fundamentally inescapable because it is not a physical presence, 
even in a future where there is no written history, the memory carried by society will linger 
and permeate into new policy, culture, economy. Walter Benjamin, an ardent student of 
Nietzsche’s work, took the opposite view when constructing his drafts and notes for the 
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unfinished Arcades Project (Passagenwerk), a historical and philosophical explorations of 
the Paris Arcades as an emblem for the culture of the 19th century. Benjamin considered his 
goal for the book to be the building of a “dreaming city,” and while the text was never 
finished, its current state is a testament to the value of collecting and collaging historical 
material as a means of understanding the way the present is shaped and the social 
responsibility contemporary individuals possess today to the future. 
One place to read this same tendency is in the poetry which seeks to tell or retell 
history, particularly the epic poem, which has historically served as an artistic 
monumentalizing of nationalist pride and narrative, as in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene or 
Whitman’s Leaves of Grass. But if we are to postulate a writing which does not flatten the 
complexities of historical and social narratives along national lines, then it is necessary to 
find an adequate example in a different kind of epic poem. 
Louis Zukofsky is a poet whose work, despite its contributions to the second- 
generation modernist aesthetics, carries a tendentious and under-appreciated relationship to 
high modernism. During the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, Zukofsky seemed on the verge of 
breaking through into the mainstream of American avant-garde poetry, but alas, his 
publishing output was limited, and the financial constraints forced to him to take up 
employment in schools and for the WPA project until his retirement in the 1960’s. His 
writing went largely ignored throughout his career, though his post-retirement period proved 
to be the time of his most prolific output. Although Zukofsky was not fully embraced by the 
movements of early modernism, his work is nevertheless a stunning instance of this era of 
literary and artistic production and therefore provides a productive source of inquiry into an 
under-discussed practitioner of experimental writing: his writing is historical, of its moment. 
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Zukofsky’s magnum opus, the epic poem “A”, was written in a period stretching 
from 1928 to 1974. It is one of the most ambitious and experimental long poems of the 
twentieth century. It is also one of the most challenging. Zukofsky’s project is concerned 
with the concepts of historiography, poetic tradition, and the limits and potentials of 
language. At over 800-pages, “A” is composed of 24 “movements”, like Homer’s epics, but 
there is no semblance of any overarching narrative or plot. It is a poem concerned with 
poetry, predating some of the metaprosodic concerns of the Language poets of the 1970’s 
and 80’s. 
This project is aimed at arriving at a reading of Zukofsky’s “A” on different terms 
than those which have been taken up by scholarship in the past. Much of the study of 
Zukofsky hones in on his work’s complexities and the task of explaining their significance in 
a coherent manner. I propose a reading that considers the work as a machine, with its vast use 
of referentiality reaching out to various historical moments and entangling together disparate 
temporalities. It is important to consider “A” within the context of its composition, but I 
contend that due to the central role that history plays in the structure and content of the text, 
it is necessary to read “A” along the lines of its engagement with historical material, not as 
an end in itself, but as the point of departure for cultivating a poetic consciousness which 
absorbs and embodies that history. 
If history is the narrativizing of the past, then “A” is anything but history; it is a 
deposit, a heap. It is a pile of notes, broken statues, old songs, favorite poems, the remains of 
time passed and the artifacts of the poet’s personal life. Zukofsky reorients historical 
perspective by eschewing linearity and presenting history as a collage of these fragments. 
This method allows for the reorganization of time along the lines of poetic developments; it 
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is no longer organized by chronology, but by movements of language, where figures like 
Catullus and Shakespeare function as guideposts through history. By reading history through 
its writing and thereby altering the traditional view of that history’s order, Zukofsky is 
attempting to carve out a new poetic that is as disruptive to poetic tradition as it is to 
historiography. It tests the limits of what is communicative in language and, more 
importantly, the possibilities of language that does not follow lines of tradition. Though it is 
grounded in a firm understanding of what has come before, Zukofsky’s writing hypothesizes 
a kind of poetry that is not the logical successor to its history. Rather, he folds the past into 
his work in a way that makes it seem like the history of poetry is happening all at once. 
If we read the poem in this way, we stand to gain a more nuanced understanding of 
the productive role that engagement with history can serve in contemporary poetics, as well 
as problems of history writing and the ways in which we think about history, an issue 
articulated by Walter Benjamin in “On the Concept of History” (1940). We do not look back 
on history in a clear path that leads to where we are standing; we look back at a tangled mess, 
and, as Zukofsky shows, there is “no key to the tangle” (“A” 518). By synthesizing the 
concept of history put forth by Benjamin and the methods of reading language and sign- 
production by Gilles Deleuze, particularly in his concept of a “stuttering language,” I argue 
that Zukofsky employs a fractured, vibrating language to show both the seams of language 
and its implications in the ways the past is retold through that language. In doing so, 
Zukofsky puts forth a model of historical writing in the epic that does not “contain history,” 
as the poet Ezra Pound sought to do, but (re)produces it and makes it new. It is in this way 
that Zukofsky merges the concerns of history, poetic tradition, and the possibilities of 
language. 
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Review of Scholarship 
 
The body of critical scholarship on Zukofsky’s work is marked by its paucity. Very 
few printed works are dedicated solely to Zukofsky, and only one is devoted to “A”. In that 
text, Barry Ahearn’s Zukofsky’s “A”, he writes that scholarship is not ready to devote that 
much study to the poem (1). As such, he does not even claim the book to be a comprehensive 
study of the poem on the whole. While Ahearn’s work is the most insightful and “complete” 
reading of “A” as a whole, its status as the only such book to approach Zukofsky indicates 
the necessity of a more devoted and in-depth reading of the most ambitious work Zukofsky 
produced. This is not a criticism of scholarship in particular cases, but the identification of a 
certain gap in the field of Zukofsky studies. This gap is a challenge but necessitates the 
advancement of a reading of Zukofsky’s work grounded in the relationship between the poet 
and his past. 
My reading of the scholarship on Zukofsky has led me to a reading which centers 
itself closely on “A”, taking into account Zukofsky’s engagement with the history of 
literature toward a close reading of its intricate and diverse form and emphasis on sound. At 
the same time, I intend to move beyond simply surveying the work or explaining its 
forms/techniques as their own end, avoiding the scholarly tendency to rely too heavily on his 
biography, especially concerning his immediate literary predecessors. 
The earliest criticism on the work of Zukofsky comes primarily in the writing of other 
poets, some of whom were close friends with him. Zukofsky’s involvement with the short- 
lived Objectivist movement, ushered in for a 1931 issue of Poetry, provided a group of poets, 
like George Oppen and Charles Reznikoff, with an outlet to pursue what Zukofsky termed in 
an introduction to the issue as the perfect representation of “historical and contemporary 
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particulars” (Prepositions+ 12). But the two most prominent writers to applaud Zukofsky’s 
work at this early stage, who would be his most-discussed interlocutors, were the high 
modernists Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams. The bulk of scholarship on Zukofsky 
comes from the decades after his death in 1978, and it was not until the mid-1990’s with 
works by critics such as Bob Perelman, Peter Quartermain, and Charles Bernstein that truly 
productive scholarship commenced. However, Pound had published prose discussing his 
work as early as 1933. Addressing Zukofsky, alongside Basil Bunting and Marianne Moore, 
Pound asserts in a review of the Active Anthology that the distaste for Zukofsky’s work is 
“due to haste” and that “Zukofsky, Bunting and Miss Moore are all thoughtful, much more so 
than the public desires” (Pound 399-400). As one of the earliest references to his poetry, this 
critique by Pound is a poignant indicator of the trajectory of Zukofsky scholarship to the 
present, when scholars still spend most of their energy in the attempt to assert what it is 
Zukofsky is even describing. 
In a less public fashion, there is an abundance (far too much to detail here) of both 
praise and criticism given by Williams in the letters he exchanged with Zukofsky. In close to 
four decades of correspondence, Williams gives constant feedback on the development of 
“A” until his death in 1963, and the publication of these letters provides an unparalleled 
source of insight into the revision of the poem, as well as Williams’ own praise and critique 
of the work. In a letter from February 1937, Williams writes to Zukofsky: “I think you are 
doing an important thing and doing it with surprising skill and persistence. But don’t expect 
the mountain to come to you – in the form of a public demonstration. I know you don’t 
expect that” (Williams/Zukofsky 245). Williams and Pound, the two early champions of his 
work, also serve as the most common comparisons or touchstones for reckoning with the 
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difficulty of Zukofsky’s work. It must be noted here that these two figures, although they did 
indeed provide significant personal contributions to the poem, did not issue a prescriptive 
aesthetic model for Zukofsky to adopt. I believe that this work is crucial in in a biographical 
sense, that Pound and Williams bore great influence on the young Zukofsky, but Rachel 
DuPlessis’s Purple Passages or Sandra Stanley’s Louis Zukofsky and the Transformation of 
American Poetics, and especially the former, treat him more or less as a facet of the study of 
Pound or Williams. Zukofsky’s engagement with writers before his time is too broad to be 
limited to these two poets/ 
L.S. Dembo’s essay “Louis Zukofsky: Objectivist Poetics and the Quest for Form” 
offers an example of criticism concerning “A” prior to its completion in 1974, giving some 
insight into the state of (the relatively sparse) scholarship on Zukofsky during his lifetime. 
Although his reading is not as extensive as later scholarship, the timeliness of his analysis is 
useful in contextualizing the progression of depth in the scholarship concerning Zukofsky, 
but only in a speculative sense. Dembo also conducted one of the only printed interviews 
with Zukofsky. This interview is referenced in almost every study of Zukofsky as a point of 
clarification for some of his artistic aims, but it is ironically important for the way Zukofsky 
eschews the responsibility of explaining his own work, even to Dembo, responding at one 
point to a question concerning the structure of “A”: “I don’t know about the structure of 
“A”. I don’t care how you consider it” (Prepositions+ 246). 
Even the most comprehensive study of “A” to date continues to eschew that 
responsibility. Ahearn takes as his project not the task of systematically analyzing the 
entirety of “A”, as he writes “This book is not a guide to the poem; no one knows enough 
about “A” to write one. It is rather a history of the poem’s growth” (xi). The humble task of 
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tracking the development of Zukofsky’s poem was the first book of its kind and remained the 
only until a later biography/critical study on Zukofsky was published by Mark Scroggins 
(The Poem of a Life 2007). 
Ahearn groups the poem’s 24 movements into four sections by what he sees as the 
major thrust of each section: 1-7 (“the self cut loose from the family circle and an ancient, 
cohesive culture”); 8-12 (“the poet examines and creates connections between past and 
present, specifically the relation of himself and his poem to history and literary tradition”); 
13-20 (“catalogues mingled disasters and good fortune”); and 21-24 (“expands to a 
comprehensive view of personal, human, and natural history”) (Ahearn xi-xii). 
While Ahearn’s reading of “A” is admittedly cursory, it does provide the first 
reading-through of the entire poem. Not every section is given equal attention, but this is a 
necessity when summarizing a poem that resists comprehension. The entanglement of 
biographical and literary analysis is a more nuanced and multifaceted means of 
understanding the poem structurally and thematically, as opposed to explaining away the 
work line-by-line solely through biographical information. However, Zukofsky himself may 
have been dismayed at the turn to the biographical in a poem that is self-sufficient. He says to 
Dembo in their interview, quoting his poem, “The Old Poet Moves to a New Apartment 14 
Times,” “All the questions here are answered with their own words…” (Prepositons+ 233). 
Sandra Stanley’s book Louis Zukofsky and the Transformation of American Poetics 
serves as the most extensive study centered on Zukofsky’s literary relationships, both within 
his personal reading of past figures, as well as those he knew personally, like Pound and 
Williams. Perhaps the most significant aspect of Stanley’s book is the way in which she 
historicizes Zukofsky’s work not only within these aforementioned relationships, but through 
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his reading practices and responses to figures such as Marx, Spinoza, and, most significantly, 
Henry Adams, the subject of Zukofsky’s master’s thesis at Columbia, which was completed 
in 1922. By putting Zukofsky’s reading to the forefront of the study (it is the first chapter), 
Stanley contextualizes his writing within the long tradition in which he sought to be seen, not 
only as the next step of an evolving modernist poetics. However, the methodology of her 
book is primarily biographical and bibliographic; it is less of a reading of Zukofsky than it is 
a cataloguing of what he read. 
Many scholars of Zukofsky take up the task of rendering the poem into something 
more readable through the explication of his often-impenetrable prosody, or else they bask in 
the complexity of his work and perform readings that only further complicate the contents of 
his work. In the vein of the former, Bob Perelman, in The Trouble with Genius, calls for an 
allegorical reading of Zukofsky, in the form of reading “A” on the basis of musical qualities, 
not simply literary ones. Perelman argues that Zukofsky’s legacy rests in the musicality of 
his work, and so to understand “A” one must reckon with the tension therein between the 
linguistic and the sonic. This emphasis on the actual aural quality of Zukofsky’s work and 
not merely its resemblances to musical forms offers a unique departure in musical readings of 
“A”. Perelman’s reading is one of the few that does seek to understand the ways in which 
Zukofsky’s poem works, as opposed to only addressing the meaning which may be lying 
dormant within the text. His assertion that “Zukofsky’s relation to certain artists – Pound, 
Cavalcanti, Catullus, Bach – is allegorical in the sense that he identifies with their 
achievements and tries to constitute them in his own work by means of various displacements 
rather than simple imitation” affords Zukofsky the position of an autonomous author creating 
original work alongside the famous artistic figures of history, rather than that of some literary 
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torch-bearer (Perelman 173-4). The opening of “A”-1 calls for this in its own way, with the 
description of the poet experiencing the work of Bach, and I take Perelman’s reading as a 
rare instance of opening up a reading of Zukofsky on his own terms, an example for how 
further productive readings of “A” should be conducted. 
Another instance in the group of works devoted to prosodic technique is Joseph 
Conte’s Unending Design: The Forms of Postmodern Poetry, which is a devoted and detailed 
study of the forms of postmodern poetry, as well as one of the few studies that identifies 
Zukofsky as a postmodernist, and not simply a modernist. This assertion opens up a reading 
of Zukofsky that helps to set him apart from the modernists like Pound and T.S. Eliot, not 
just as a disciple of the two, allowing Zukofsky to occupy a space outside of their shadow, 
and affording him the critical agency to depart from the tendencies of modernist poetry 
toward something truly revolutionary that is capable of producing new meaning. When 
scholars like DuPlessis rely so heavily on the kind of comparison Zukofsky has drawn to 
Pound, their readings of his poetic methods bottleneck, so that Zukofsky’s most potentially 
innovative work may go unaddressed because it is not relevant to the study of the poet’s to 
which he is compared. Conte’s study enables scholarship to escape the patterns of this kind 
of work by treating Zukofsky on his own terms. 
Conte’s focus on poetic form is the thrust of the book, and he details several 
categories of form and their relation to the postmodern poets like Zukofsky, John Ashberry, 
Robert Creeley, and Lorine Niedecker. The forms discussed in relation to Zukofsky’s poetry 
are mainly the sestina, the canonic poem, and the fugue. By exploring the use of these tropes 
in Zukofsky’s work, Conte is able to contextualize Zukofsky within long poetic traditions 
while simultaneously arriving at the heart of their postmodern characteristics: the upending 
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of tradition, sense, form. Conte, like Perelman, provides one of the few readings which truly 
emphasizes the musical quality of “A” by comparing it to the musical forms of the fugue and 
the canon. These two tropes, while discussed as formalist techniques, point to the possibility 
of reading the techniques of fugue and canon in relation to Zukofsky’s concerns of 
historiography. This mindset puts Zukofsky on the same plane as all of the poets with which 
he interacts in his texts, as Perelman suggests, and the result is the possibility of considering 
Zukofsky as a kind of contemporary to his influences and the interlocutors of “A”. In order 
to read “A” against the grain of linear historical narrative, it is necessary to alter the 
consideration of Zukofsky as merely the last in a line of poets that build upon each other in a 
single, continuous trajectory, and instead read Zukofsky as one poet in a heap of poets, much 
like “A” functions as a heap of words, not a string of them. 
Peter Quartermain’s Disjunctive Poetics: From Gertrude Stein and Louis Zukofsky to 
Susan Howe focuses on the concept of disruption in Zukofsky’s work, and approaches, in 
several chapters, the various methods and scales on which Zukofsky is disrupting the 
traditions of poetic technique. In the chapter “Finnegan’s Wake and Middle and Late 
Zukofsky” Quartermain focuses on the influence of Joyce on Zukofsky, and takes up a 
microscopically-close reading, which deals mostly with the beginning of “A” – 22, “AN 
ERA / ANY TIME / OF YEAR,” and the combinatorial etymological (mainly Greek and 
Latin) and homophonic play; Quartermain identifies Joyce as an important interlocutor 
(along with Lewis Carrol) with Zukofsky’s kaleidoscopic verse, and the multiplication of 
meaning when reading “A” the way that Zukofsky read Joyce. 
Quartermain considers the form of “A” as a whole – its 24 movements marked by 
ruptures in theme, form, and content. Reading the form on this scale, he concludes, “[“A”] 
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will, if we have the patience, change the way we think, for such is the effect of mischief and 
play” (69). For example, Quartermain determines that “[t]he smoothness of form that marks 
“A” – 9 as a whole covers a radical shift in Zukofsky’s own thought: the break from Marx, 
hereon absent, and the entrance of family, hereon central. And, with this, a major and formal 
shift, from the propositional to the meditative” (60). By recognizing this seismic shift in the 
structure of the poem, Quartermain asserts that the poem opens itself up to the “complexities 
of interrelationship, and his aim is to achieve a simultaneity of multiples, political, aesthetic, 
historical, economic, linguistic” (61). 
Furthermore, in addressing the scope of “A” which typically results with the 
reductionist conclusion of comparing it to the range of The Cantos, Quartermain argues 
against the overwhelming influence of Pound, which he characterizes as “the academic 
custom of accommodating itself to anything new in literature by reading it in terms of 
‘influences’ rather than struggling with the writing on its own terms” (63). Instead, he 
identifies the unwieldy final movements of “A”, as an example of Zukofsky’s 
“instantaneous” nature, against Pound’s totalistic aims in The Cantos (63). Relating 
Zukofsky’s “work with syllables” to the likes of writers Joyce, Apollinaire, and Stein, 
Quartermain’s conclusion that, “Dense, concentrated, baffling in the playfulness of its syntax 
and puns, beautiful in its music, and in its sheer lyric passages,” “A” poses the potential for a 
fruitful reading Zukofsky’s epic that acknowledges but upends the poetry which came before 
it, and therefore seeks to establish Zukofsky outside of the mere consideration of his work as 
a “product” of the poets before him (69). Although at times the extent of his Joycean reading 
of “A” begins to miss the forest for the trees, I take Quartermain’s work as an example of the 
kind of close reading necessary to open up the way that “A” engenders continuous 
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production of meaning, rather than serving as a puzzle waiting to be solved. An important 
note of Quartermain’s is the commonality of colonial language in the works of Zukofsky and 
Joyce, and this subject is one I take up later in regards to the Deleuzoguattarian concept of 
the “minor language.” 
While the majority of the previous scholarship concerning Zukofsky is valuable in 
their contributions to a minor author, what is most significant is the gaps in said scholarship. 
In some places, a significant aspect of Zukofsky’s writing is gestured toward but not 
explored fully, and these gaps are what shape the mode of inquiry in this project. Perelman’s 
nod to the allegorical in “A” is most helpful in its recognition of the possibility of reading 
Zukofsky alongside his predecessors and not just a product of them or a case study in 
divergence from dominant modes of the poetic avant-garde. 
Although not addressing “A” itself, poet and critic Charles Bernstein, who also wrote 
the introduction to Zukofsky’s Selected Poems, addresses Zukofsky in an essay on 
homophonic translation, in which Bernstein mentions the homophonic reworking of the 
poetry of Catullus done by both Celia and Louis Zukofsky. Echoing Walter Benjamin’s 
theories of translation, Bernstein asserts that “Homophonic translation is significant because 
it can symbolize the revenge of the translator: no longer invisible through the text’s opacity 
making the “original” invisible” (66). These translations privilege the sound of the original 
over the translation of lexical meaning, and while the Catullus translations are not a part of 
“A”, this same reading applies also to the same kind of translations found in the epic. “A”- 
21, for instance, is a similar rewriting of Rudens by the Roman author Plautus, and there are 
additional examples throughout the poem, such as the translating of The Epic of Gilgamesh 
in “A”-23. This project is not concerned entirely with the practice of 
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translation/transformation in Zukofsky’s work, though it will address these themes as they 
are relevant, primarily to “A”-21. But what is most useful in reading Bernstein’s essay is the 
treatment of historical material in contemporary writing: the ways in which the present voice 
sounds out works of the past and reformulates them to a current historical and political 
moment. Bernstein’s methodology, in this essay and the other essays of Attack of the Difficult 
Poems, serves as a guiding principle in this reading “A”. 
 
 
Methodology/Conclusion 
 
Considering these trends in scholarship, it seems that a different kind of reading “A” 
is in order, though I owe scholarly debt to Perelman, Quartermain, and Bernstein, in 
particular. In his essay “On the Concept of History,” Walter Benjamin writes of the issues of 
historicism and the problems of viewing the past as a continuum. His invocation of a work by 
Paul Klee, Angelus Novus (1920), is a useful image for considering the position of the epic 
poem and its author in relation to the history it seeks to represent. Of the angel, Benjamin 
writes, “His eyes are opened wide, his mouth stands open and his wings are outstretched. The 
Angel of History must look just so. His face is turned towards the past. Where we see the 
appearance of a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles 
rubble on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet” (392). Unlike The Cantos, which do 
privilege this chain of events, Zukofsky’s interaction with historical materialism and 
historiography are akin to the concerns expressed by Benjamin in this essay, and in many 
ways “A” functions as this “single catastrophe.” Its monumentality, difficulties of 
interpretation, and shifting nature render “A” as a kind of microcosm of the problem with 
which it is dealing, and therefore I can see no better source of study for this problem of 
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historical representation and the ways in which Zukofsky turns his engagement with that 
history into a poetics that both acknowledges and absorbs the past while putting forth 
radically new ways of looking back at it. 
The philosophical thought and reading practices developed by French 
poststructuralist Gilles Deleuze provide a suitable framework for reinterpreting Zukofsky’s 
language at the point for which he calls. The works by Deleuze that are primarily relevant are 
his collection of literary “case studies” Essays Clinical and Critical (1993), as well as his 
collaborative writings with psychoanalyst Félix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (1972), A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980), and What is Philosophy? (1991). Deleuze’s work and the ways in which it 
departs from “traditional” readings of classic philosophical texts by Nietzsche, Kant, Freud, 
and Marx serve as an excellent model for performing a similarly untraditional reading of the 
rather cryptic and diversely-interpreted work of Zukofsky. 
In terms of concepts, the primary relevant terminology put forth by Deleuze in 
relation to this project are his concepts of 1) the dissolution of the subject, 2) the 
minorization of politics (derived from the work Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, also 
written with Guattari), and 3) the stuttering of language, all tendencies identified by editor 
Daniel Smith in his introduction to Essays Clinical and Critical (Smith xxiv). The other 
works serve as models of reading texts as sites of meaning-production and not vessels for 
static meaning, explored in his book on Proust. Following William Carlos Williams decree 
that a poem is a “small (or large) machine made of words,” through these practices I read 
Zukofsky’s work for its machinic properties, to analyze the way the poem works through, 
produces, and troubles language as operating in a state of equilibrium, rather than 
interpreting the difficulties in what his language does to convey a narrative arc. I contend that 
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this method will afford an approach to “A” that is lacking in scholarship which merely reads 
 
Zukofsky’s difficult language as an end in itself. 
 
First, this project will put forth the idea that Zukofsky’s work, as he urged in a letter 
to Babette Deutsch, should be read literally (“A” viii). This is not a poem that merely strives 
for some kind of aesthetic prowess but is showing the seams of language and its capacities. It 
is thus necessary to read his language not solely through the allegorical lenses employed by 
previous scholars. The language must be read for what it does, not what it means or contains 
or refers to. This is indicated in Zukofsky’s reluctance to respond candidly to many of 
Dembo’s questions; almost all his responses point back to a reading of the poem, either by 
Zukofsky’s compelling readers to read closer or by quoting the poems directly back at the 
interviewer, resisting the call to explain his own work. 
This project is one concerned with how the past is internalized in Zukofsky 
construction of a poetic subjectivity. In keeping with that concern, the surprising lack of 
recognition in Zukofsky scholarship on the resonances between “A” and Benjamin’s notion 
of history and historiography provides the organizing principle of my analysis. In 
recognizing this resonance, we might address the role that Zukofsky’s own reading of the 
past plays in his writing, instead of considering him as a “present” individual sitting outside 
of the implications of events passed or current. For instance, in “A”-6, Zukofsky outlines his 
guidelines for poetic representation: 
My one voice. My other: is 
An objective – rays of the object brought to a focus, 
An objective – nature as creator – desire 
for what is objectively perfect 
Inextricably the direction of historic and 
contemporary particulars. 
 
J.S.B: a particular, 
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His Matthew Passion, a particular (“A” 24) 
 
These “particulars,” are the historical objects that Zukofsky takes as his subject; their 
representation is the primary focus of his writing. His writing is responding to and re- 
presenting the objects of the past, whether these objects are works of art, in the case of music 
and literature, or actual events that have served as monolithic markers in history, as 
monuments. 
The role of history-telling is common in the epic poem, which is exhibited in poems 
as old as The Iliad all the way to The Cantos. From the ancient epics accounting for the 
origin of a people, such as the Aeneid, or Milton’s Paradise Lost telling the story of the Fall 
(human history), to modern examples such as Charles Olson’s Maximus Poems accounting 
for 400 years of history in the town of Gloucester, Massachusetts, the epic poem has long 
been the mode for definitively laying claim to the arrival of a current moment. For Zukofsky, 
the poetic inspiration comes from the connection made between historical distant moments, 
rather than the desire to record a single, linear history. 
In the case of “A”, it is the poet seeing a performance of the Matthew Passion, 
“Composed seventeen twenty-nine, / Rendered at Carnegie Hall, / Nineteen twenty-eight” 
that inspires the poet to begin the work (“A” 1-2). The historical object, in this case music, is 
a poetic foundation very different from the broader historical concerns of the epics 
mentioned above, corresponding to Benjamin’s notion of the “dialectical image.” Howard 
Eiland’s introduction to the English translation of Benjamin’s Arcades Project addresses this 
concept, and although he writes only of its relevance to Benjamin’s opus, the concept is 
uncannily suited to a characterization of the treatment of the historical object in “A”. Eiland 
writes, 
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the historical object of interpretation: that which, under the divinatory gaze of the 
collector, is taken up into the collector’s own particular time and place, thereby 
throwing a pointed light on what has been. Welcomed into the present moment that 
seems to be waiting just for it—“actualized,” as Benjamin likes to say—the moment 
from the past comes alive as never before in this way, the “now” is itself experienced 
as preformed in the “then,” as its distillation—thus the leading motif of precursors in 
the text. The historical object is reborn as such into a present day capable of receiving 
it, of suddenly “recognizing” it (Benjamin xii) 
This is what Benjamin terms the “now of recognizability” (Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit), and the 
interplay between past and present, the resistance of the urge to look back on the past without 
acknowledging the role of the vantage point in how we evaluate history. 
This is exactly how Zukofsky figures his treatment of historical material, or the 
 
“common air,” which he characterizes as 
 
Events listening to their own tremors. 
Beings and no more than breath 
between them 
Histories, differences, walls, 
And the words which bind them no more than 
“So that,” “and” – 
The thought in the melody moves – (“A” 27) 
 
Like Benjamin, Zukofsky does not read the history as a causal chain; the connections shift in 
eye of the beholder, and across time those association will typically change. The duration of 
the poem’s composition makes this all the more interesting because there is a record of one 
poet’s shifting historical perspective across almost fifty years. The events and objects of 
interest change, as do “the words which bind them.” He is roaming the halls of artifacts, 
ignoring anachronism and putting things together only as they make sense to him in the 
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present moment. The task for the reader of “A”, then, is to begin sifting through these 
artifacts, to attempt to make sense of them as they did perhaps only to Zukofsky. 
This is a resistance of monolithic memory and representation, as well as aesthetic 
tradition. Bernstein argues, “In place of the sometimes overwhelming monumentalism of 
“the” great poem, Zukofsky emphasized the need for “a” series of poems. He rejected the 
major key for the minor chords, universals for particulars, the grandiose for discreteness” 
(Pitch of Poetry 100) 1. His emphasis on particularity is precisely the kind of undoing of the 
monolithic that enables rupturing the stolid representations which make up the definite “the”. 
Referring to Bernadette Mayer’s Memory and Studying Hunger, Paul Stephens identifies an 
attempt “to reconfigure memory so as to be able to think “without remembering” – that is, to 
reveal underlying structures of memory so as to resist static patterns of recollection” and that 
this “accumulation becomes a kind of anti-style that refuses to keep secrets” (123). I would 
contend that Zukofsky’s work, too, resists stagnant recollection or reproduction, and by 
including so many artifacts of memory and nostalgia, both cultural and personal, is 
reconfiguring the ways in which a history may be written or, better yet, unwritten. 
For example, Zukofsky’s plea to “let me live here ever, / sweet now” at the outset of 
“A”-22 calls for that embrace of the now, to exist not within the reproductions of the past but 
to live in the time of creation, which may only occur in the present (508). This perching of 
the poet, looking back, is reminiscent of the angel of Klee interpreted by Benjamin: it is not 
the task of the poet to rehash old forms, but to create these things new. Apart from poetic 
obligation, the individual as a present body should not be subjected to live in some interim 
 
1 Zukofsky’s first published poem was in part a parody of Eliot’s Waste Land, entitled Poem Beginning “The”. 
The shift from his first major work’s use of the definitive “The” to the indeterminacy of “A”, while only a 
matter of title, is an apt illustration of many larger shifts in Zukofsky’s style towards the specific and serial, as 
exhibited in 80 Flowers. 
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between historical moments and images but be free to live and create, constituted of the past 
but not necessarily defined by it. 
But the call to “live here ever” is not so simple: to live “(where?) dig or not / piece 
dig who with what / what with” represents confusion with where to begin living now (510). 
This is an illustration of the aforementioned heap. Where does one start to dig? How to 
begin? Searching for what? The task of dredging up the past is one riddled with dangers, but, 
as the poet asks, “little horse can you speak”?: “won’t know till it speaks” and thus the 
answer may only be found in the doing, may not be premeditated or predicted until its arrival 
(511). 
Along with the philosophy of Benjamin, the work of Gilles Deleuze, as well as his 
collaborations with Félix Guattari, serves as an important touchstone for this reading, as his 
concepts enable a reading of Zukofsky’s language that has not yet been approached in 
scholarship. While I have addressed the broader practice of reading “A” for its machinic 
properties – a practice encouraged by the methodology of their work A Thousand Plateaus – 
the most important of Deleuze’s concepts to this reading is the stuttering of language, first 
put forth in the essay “He Stuttered,” from Essays Clinical and Critical. 
Deleuze begins the essay by invoking the stutter of Melville’s Billy Budd, noting that 
the compositional technique invoked in the title, to say what the character is doing falls short 
of the possibility of when “saying it is doing it,” allowing for the moment in which “It is no 
longer the character who stutters in speech; it is the writer who becomes a stutterer in 
language. He makes the language as such stutter: an affective and intensive language, and no 
longer an affectation of the one who speaks” (107). 
Rowe 22 
 
This break between the effectuation of real speech and the tension within the 
language system itself serves as an incredibly useful model for reading the apparent 
incoherence of much of Zukofsky’s writing, as in “A”-23’s “Ye nó we see hay / io we hay 
we see / hay io we sée no” (539). In this passage we encounter a language with no ready 
semantic meaning, but perhaps it puts forth a language that, rather than seeking to emulate 
“authentic” speech, seeks to emulate a “pure” language, a poetry which, as Heidegger posits 
in his essay “Language,” is the best place to start a study of the ways in which language itself 
speaks. 
By reading Zukofsky’s work alongside Deleuze’s concept of stuttering, we begin to 
see in “A” the showing of a disequilibrium in language, as Deleuze terms it. The truncation 
of syntax in Zukofsky’s work, the incessant confusion of parts of speech with discontinuous, 
unpunctuated clauses, indistinguishable from one another, puts into question even the 
simplest kind of linguistic or semantic clarity. Deleuze argues that “if the system appears in 
perpetual disequilibrium or bifurcation, if each of its terms in turn passes through a zone of 
continuous variation then the language itself will begin to vibrate and stutter, but without 
being confused with speech, which never assumes more than one variable position among 
others, or moves in more than one direction” (108). Zukofsky’s language does indeed boom 
and crash, upsetting a linear flow of narrative into a fractured, fleeing fragments of words 
which represent “the outside of language” (112). 
I will explore the resulting quality of this crash as one of disintegration, which 
follows the opposite process of integration leading up to the final movement of “A”. 
The last portion of “He Stuttered” invokes the larger project pursued by Deleuze and 
 
Guattari in Kafka through the concept of a minor literature. Deleuze writes that what writers 
Rowe 23 
 
like Kafka, Beckett, and, by my estimate, Zukofsky, do “is invent a minor use of a major 
language within which they express themselves entirely; they minorize this language, much 
as in music, where the minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in perpetual 
disequilibrium… they make the language, they send it racing to the witch’s line, ceaselessly 
placing it in a state of disequilibrium… following an incessant modulation” (109) The racing 
speed of sections “A”-22/23 play this tendency out to its logical end, giving history without 
narrative, employing language like paint in a Pollock work. What we are given is a language 
that collapses on itself and gives birth to a new one, for we know all the words used by 
Zukofsky but have never heard them in quite this manner, even when the words have been 
sourced from elsewhere. Zukofsky is a practitioner of defamiliarization, not only of words 
but of history as well. 
“A” is the kind of text that exemplifies the urge to create something all-encompassing 
is described in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus as “the total work, all 
combinations inside the book, the tree-book, the cosmos-book: all of these platitudes so dear 
to the avant-gardes, which cut the book off from its relations with the outside, are even worse 
than the chant of the signifier (127). This “chant of the signifier” is the sign that rules despite 
its removal from the actual; it is a purely virtual sign. The text most emblematic of the total 
work for Deleuze and Guattari is the Bible, the text that seeks to explain the entire universe. 
However, they identify the same tendencies of the Bible in modern writing as well, “Wagner, 
Mallarmé, and Joyce, Marx and Freud: still Bibles,” and argue that “[i]f passional delusion is 
profoundly monomaniacal, monomania for its part found a fundamental element of its 
assemblage in monotheism and the Book” (127). This adherence to the singularity, the thing 
which encompasses all by retreating from the affects that surround it, is a politically 
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dangerous scenario. The reverence to the monomaniacal text is problematic by virtue of its 
solipsism; the text resists interaction, necessitates the priestly explanation, and as Benjamin 
writes this text runs the “danger of becoming the tool of the ruling class” (391). These are 
texts that cut themselves off from the world without, and therefore render themselves as 
uninterpretable to the public. 
What is needed, then, is a work full of holes, a work that offers an escape and resists 
authoritative interpretation, and Deleuze and Guatarri’s model, established in their concepts 
as well as in the construction of their book on the whole, provides a means of analyzing “A” 
as much on philosophical terms as those literary. While “A” seems to fall into this category 
of the “tree-book”, I contend that it is, in fact, a work which offers a way out, pointing in 
every direction across time and outside language. Its stuttering “is what makes language 
grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome instead of a tree” 
(Deleuze 111). In fact, in certain sections the poem even offers instructions for reading, 
resisting the need for the priest-interpreter, “Attentive as / good: no prophet no poet” (511). 
Zukofsky urges us to read closely; there is no need for external interpretation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The first chapter of this project is concerned primarily with movements 22 and 23 of 
Zukofsky’s “A”. These two movements follow the same form, which consists of 1,000 lines, 
with five words for each line. Using this symmetrical form, both movements gloss over and 
index thousands of years of history. In “A”-22 the geological and political history of an eon 
are rifled through/rearranged, and in “A”-23 we see the progression of literary language over 
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centuries of various traditions of writing, including a homophonic translation of the Epic of 
Gilgamesh. 
The rationale behind this grouping, aside from their mirrored forms, is that the pairing 
allows for an extended analysis of the work which exemplifies the height of Zukofsky’s 
style. The drastic truncation of syntax, the way the language seems to skip and trip over 
itself, is at once a culminating feature of Zukofsky’s poetic trajectory and a technique of 
transmitting his philosophies about history and historiography. The first unbroken section of 
“A”-22 begins, 
Late later and much later 
Surge sea erupts boiling molten 
Lava island from ice, land 
Seen into color thru day 
And night: voiced, once unheard 
Earth beginning idola of years 
That love well forget late. 
“A”-22 (511) 
 
These sections both articulate in their forms the way histories are used, but simultaneously 
problematize this use through their approaching of the upper limit of value when these 
characteristics are carried out to their logical end. By beginning with the skipping ahead of 
some vast, indeterminate period, Zukofsky highlights the necessity to glossing over 
incomprehensible swaths of time. Yet within only a few lines, we see the presence of a 
human enter, once it is “seen,” and there is thus a collision of the purely geological, non- 
human phenomena with the emergence of a seeing eye that creates the “idola”, or the first 
moment of human recreation and representation in the budding landscape. Similarly, “A”-23 
opens with the musing on the “world worn in whose / happiest reins preempt their histories” 
which views this history as nothing more than an organizing factor, a way in which “and’s / 
compound creature and creature together” (536). 
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Without falling into the same trope of automatically pairing Zukofsky’s work with 
that of Pound, I do think some actual reading of the portrayal or act of history writing in The 
Cantos, as another example of an epic would be useful in delineating the unique way in 
which Zukofsky handles the problem of comprehensively recounting the historical. For 
instance, the “inscription” at the beginning of “A”-22 reads, “AN ERA / ANY TIME / OF 
YEAR” (508). This ambiguous and indeterminate opening to a poem depicting a linear 
history presents a distinct view from Pound’s poem, which seeks to include all of a history in 
a more specific manner of academic certainty, as in the case of its opening with a 
paraphrasing of Homer’s Odyssey which seems to say that this poem begins with the 
beginning of Western literature. In Pitch of Poetry, Charles Bernstein characterizes “A”-22 
as a “valentine tercet, made with nine vowels and nine consonants that concatenate multiple 
plays on era/anno/aer/are, and on a/an/any, and also on year/ear… a round of these six 
words shows the care in all to come anon” (109). This opening is, as Quartermain suggests, a 
concise illustration of the sheer possibility of linguistic play in reading Zukofsky’s work: an 
“instant entirety.” 
This chapter is where the primary application and analysis of Deleuze and his concept 
of a stuttering language will apply. Zukofsky’s language and its breakneck speed, 
simultaneously displays the kind of self-awareness in language that Deleuze advocates, as 
well as providing a potential solution to the problem of recounting a history that cannot be 
contained in a single volume. This method employs two categories that require dissection: 1) 
the curation of historical content and 2) the presentation of that content. 
It is in this sense that we may read “A” not as a story but as a kind of museum. This 
is, however, not to say that the museum fixes the problems posed by written histories, but it 
Rowe 27 
 
does maintain an awareness of discontinuity that is absent in many of these historical 
accounts and ever-present in the work of Zukofsky. One example of this trope in “A” is the 
use of a kind of ekphrastic writing, as in the elegy to William Carlos Williams in “A”-17 
which contains an almost indistinguishable amount of Williams’ own writing folded into that 
of Zukofsky. This serves as a reminder that this is a poem of a life, not an absent narrator 
reflecting on the past. It is as Benjamin writes, not a recognition of “the way it really was” 
but “a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger” (391). Zukofsky is not walking 
backwards through history but sifting through the images of this memory at an urgent 
historical moment and piling them up. 
Chapter II – “To answer with the knowledge of history I have”: “A”-21 & 24 and 
Historical Interaction 
The second chapter deals with movements “A”-21 and “A”-24. While 22/23 follow 
an identical pattern of form, 21/24 are less concerned with prosodic form than with the 
function of non-poetic structures like theatre and music, respectively. “A”-21 is a 
homophonic translation of Rudens by 3rd century B.C. Roman playwright Plautus. The plot 
summary provided at the outset of “A”-21 serves as an apt indicator of the kind of disjointed 
engagement with Plautus’ original text that Zukofsky is performing, as it reads “fisheRman’s 
sea net dragged Up a leathery wicker / rattling the baby’s charms of his master’s Daughter / 
a leno had kidnapped for his slave brothEl” (438). “A”-24 is a musical setting of Zukofsky’s 
past works (including those outside of “A”) as the libretto to the music of Handel harpsicord 
pieces and consists of almost 250 pages. “A”-24 is by far the most ambitious piece of 
Zukofsky’s writing (See Fig. 1), primarily in the complicated matter of whether or not to 
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consider it the writing of Zukofsky at all, as its lyrics do not come entirely from “A” and the 
whole section was “composed” not by Louis, but his wife Celia as a gift. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Page one of “A”-24 (“A” 566) 
While first chapter deals with the aspect of historical representation, this chapter, considering 
“A”-21/24 alongside one another, is concerned with the interaction that occurs between 
historical material and the contemporary individual engaging with that history, as Benjamin 
writes of the angel of history. This is a matter present as early as “A”-1 when the poet writes, 
while seeing a performance of Bach’s Passion of St. Matthew, 
The Passion According to Matthew, 
Composed seventeen twenty-nine, 
Rendered at Carnegie Hall, 
Nineteen twenty-eight, 
Thursday evening, the fifth of April. 
“A”-1 (1) 
This concern over the collapsed time between creation and encounter is a reoccurring theme 
of “A”, where history and the present come in contact. These are moments of collision, and 
this section traces these moments of collision as a central premise of the construction of “A”. 
Whereas “A”-22/23 display the particular prosodic style of Zukofsky, 21 and 24 display the 
more conceptual and theoretical aspects of the poem’s concern with history. They represent 
the transition from a purely detached historical method to a personal one. By “sounding out” 
the original Latin in his own English, Zukofsky effectively collapses these two distant 
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historical moments together as a means of making Rudens new, to borrow Pound’s phrase, 
 
which not only translates the work, but multiplies it. 
 
In the same sense, “A”-24 displays the interaction with history. Zukofsky is not 
indebted to Handel, not anymore, because they have become collaborators, and their work 
appears together on the same page. This is not reflective history because Zukofsky has 
moved away from simply recounting the productions of the past and shunned the 
historiographic attempts to detach the scribe from the material. Here Zukofsky is an active 
participant and by collapsing the gap in time to accommodate his own work folding in 
Handel’s he resists the continuum that Benjamin warns against and engages with the 
historical material not as an act of recording but as an act of creation and renewal. The 
analysis of “A”-24 is centered on the ways in which the movement exhibits a kind of escape- 
work. Through this methodology, Zukofsky turns away from Pound’s model of a “poem 
containing history,” where the poem seeks to circumscribe history within the poem, towards 
a mean of escaping the poem as a device of delimitation, with a poetic subject that seeks to 
connect itself to history rhizomatically at every possible point and moment. In this analysis I 
incorporate another poem, Tan Lin’s 7 Controlled Vocabularies and Obituary 2004: The 
Joys of Cooking, as a comparable poetic-theoretical model in order to hypothesize and clarify 
the potential for a poetics which attempts, by highlighting its artificial nature, to erase its own 
boundaries between it and the external world and begin to work as a part of that machine and 
not only distantly refer to or comment on it. 
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Coda 
 
To conclude the discussion of the final movements of “A” is a movement out of the 
poem and into the final collection published during Zukofsky’s lifetime, 80 Flowers. In order 
to extend the conclusions drawn from the exegesis of “A” to a more holistic perspective, 80 
Flowers serves as an ideal concluding case study into the culmination of Zukofsky’s later 
poetics and thematic concerns, from the Marxist themes of “A”-9 to the almost totally 
hermetic and personal thrust of “A”-24. The collection consists of eighty poems, each eight 
lines and five words per line, with each poem corresponding to a flower from Celia 
Zukofsky’s garden in their home. This movement into the totally hermetic, personal life of 
the poet is an illustration of the trajectory towards the personal throughout the progression of 
“A” and to provide a reading of some of these poems as a final look into the poet’s 
culminating work offers the opportunity to in some ways conclude a reading of “A”. In doing 
so, I hope to provoke some consideration of further work do be pursued in this vein. 
The work, as an anthology, feeds into itself somewhat with the subject of flowers. 
 
The Greek anthos refers to a flower, and anthology initially referred to a collection of 
flowers. The cooccurrence of these themes, in a structural sense, makes 80 Flowers an 
antithesis to the encyclopedic tendencies of “A”. If “A”, which is ordered from A-Z (“A” 
through “Zion”), represents the condensing of information in order to account for everything, 
then 80 Flowers, as an anthology in structure and content, emphasizes the act of selection 
and curation. This tendency which is present in the organization of the poem also manifests 
in the writing itself. For instance, the poem “Windflower” details only one of these eighty 
flowers: 
Windflower overworld selvageflame sun coddle 
lay dune ass toss opt 
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thrown own candle urge shade 
unhated unloved unseen slight bud 
windflower singled erst field-lily nods 
unshaded whorled th’solitary flower suns 
clouds summers asleep crowfoots spring-rue 
anemone leaves flowers both earth (Collected Shorter Poetry) 
 
It is clear that the poem lacks any kind of syntactical continuity and seems to be, if anything, 
a composite of mostly nouns and adjectives. But what at first-glance seems to be nonsense is 
precisely what is effective in this piece, for the lack of distinct clauses necessitates a kind of 
impressionistic reading of the affects produced by the images, which may combine with each 
other in any number of ways. For instance, “anemone leaves flowers” indicates at the same 
time three consecutive nouns, as well as noun, verb, object, and without the syntactical 
ambiguity afforded by the morphology of the English language this kind of linguistic free- 
play would be unavailable. Zukofsky would have had to sacrifice scope for clarity, and it is 
precisely this tension between comprehension and brevity with which Zukofsky is able to 
cope because of the methods of his truncation. “Windflower” points to the description of a 
thing unknown, “unhated unloved unseen,” yet all the same it is still depicted. The sensation 
of the flower being hidden and unacknowledged is indicative of the optics toward any 
external phenomena; the range of botanical information of the plant, its potential cultural 
connotations, its symbolic significance in the arts, etc., must be dodged in order to get at the 
thing itself. One could spend a lifetime learning of the single plant and its outward extending 
web of association, but instead Zukofsky offers the brief glance and the constellate 
description. 
Zukofsky’s style, which embraces the ambiguity of interpretation and takes joy in the 
experimental upheaval of language through “a syntax in the process of becoming, a creation 
of syntax that gives birth to a foreign language within language, a grammar of 
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disequilibrium” (Deleuze 112). This poem is, in many ways, the apotheosis of Zukofsky’s 
late poetics, where the sonic and visual aspects of his poetry reach full bloom. The musicality 
of the line “lay dune ass opt toss” is particularly characteristic of this visual/sonic melding as, 
for example, “Lay dune” can be read as an affected accent of “lay down.” This multiplicity is 
solidified in the inclusion of “opt” to the line, so that it is the reader who must decide how 
they are to translate the sound of the poem into sense. 
The complex, irregular repetition of sound takes the musical quality out of any 
traditional form, like those which utilize end rhyme or regular internal rhyme, and 
reconfigures it from a pulse to an ebb-and-flow. The “thrown own” is one instance of the 
way rhyming is removed from the structure of the poem and supplanted into a concentrated 
segment, which gives an emphasis to the rhyme by not diluting it over the course of several 
lines or stanzas. “Windflower” is at once senselessly musical and imagistically rich. The 
images of “solitary flower suns” and “slight buds” echo the imagery of the Romantic poets, 
yet their placement within the poem as a whole, with its lack of verbs, renders them quite 
distinct from those earlier poets. The overall effect is like walking through a museum of all 
the artifacts relating to a single flower, where Zukofsky employs the tropes of nature poetry 
without relying on any traditional syntax to connect them. The result is the creation of a new 
language for the natural world which relies precisely on the tension between familiar images 
and the unfamiliar poetic musicality used to fashion them together, like a quilt. 
The curation of the collection, too, points to a potential out from the issue of 
comprehensive narrative, as Zukofsky centers the survey around Celia Zukofsky’s garden. 
The selection is thus inherently personal; the specific flowers discussed are only relevant 
because they are a part of the poet’s life. In this sense, 80 Flowers displays the same 
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meditation on selective optics exhibited in the second half of “A”, as Zukofsky must 
prioritize what it is that there is time to see. The Impressionists of the late 19th Century 
sought to depict the moment as it flees from the eye; Zukofsky seeks to capture as much 
worldly affect as time offers the individual. Zukofsky’s description of “north south west east 
uncompassed / only sun unshifting wind and / wave return drifted prow home” points to the 
point in this history before a total quantification of space by human understanding (513). 
This unmapped, uncoordinated space represents a world by which human are baffled and 
made small, not a world that is assumed to be totally digested and catalogued. But for 
Zukofsky there is no need to hold onto the idyllic past, because there is only ever the present 
and future with which to be concerned. Advocating the presence of productive thought, in the 
face of an unmanageable and unchangeable history, Zukofsky writes, 
For now it is: not 
Is the same and can 
Be thought and thought is 
Now (“A” 517) 
 
The distinction drawn between the thought of the past and the thought that occurs in the 
present, the privileged thought, invokes the same thinking presented by Deleuze and Guattari 
in the introduction to What is Philosophy? (1991). They write that philosophy is not the 
reflection, contemplation, or communication of concepts but the creation of those concepts 
(Deleuze & Guattari 6). The act of concept-creation necessarily hinges upon past concepts, 
but philosophy, as well as the arts or sciences, in answer to the titular question, is thought 
now. 
Zukofsky’s question, “’if your house were burning / what would you save from / it?’ 
‘The fire’” champions in its answer the forces of change and agency (519). The force that 
takes down the house must be the affectation worth preserving. It presupposes that the 
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stagnant, fixed structure is one worth doing away with, and stable bodies, whether domestic 
or intellectual, are undesirable. He resists fixed phenomena because that force of change is 
the exertion of the will, and the resistance to the fixed body is present in his stylistic 
resistance to monolithic meaning. 
A typical ambiguity of Zukofsky’s work is present in the lines “what is it to be / 
water, butterfly or man know / stop by your own action” (520). The breakdown here between 
“man” and “know,” as clearly something has been glossed and syntactically it makes little 
sense. But the fact that it does occur between “man” and “know” speaks to the gulf between 
subjectivity, or the man considering the question of what it is to be, and knowledge, that 
ability to discern, in this case, between water, butterfly, man. The concern of these lines rests 
in the knowing of the self, and in relation to the ongoing discussion of external knowledge 
Zukofsky problematizes the stability of humanity in its relations to other life, let alone to the 
access to any understanding of that life in historical terms. In “A” Zukofsky revisits the 
traditional poetic forms of sonnet, sestina, lyrics, and ultimately the epic. But by radically 
undoing the necessity for coherence, Zukofsky shows how mind may race through the glut of 
data, and merely gestures toward the historical past, but only as it pertains to his own violent, 
creative disruption of that very history. 
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Chapter I 
 
“History a plant that dies”: “A”-22/23 and Representation 
 
Louis Zukofsky’s later poetics was formally defined by the technique of determining 
line by word-count, a tendency which is evident from “A”-14 through his final collection, 80 
Flowers. After the composition of “A”-21, Zukofsky typically developed this technique 
through the five-word line. In “A”-22/23, the five-word line is the vehicle for representing 
thousands of years of history. The effect of concision produced by this technique completely 
disrupts the practice of history writing and the constraints inherent to setting history down in 
text. As an example, a common textbook for classes in the history of Western civilization, 
Spielvogel’s Western Civilization, runs 1072 pages in its 8th edition. Regardless of page 
count, even though a thousand pages is quite a read, the ambition of translating complex 
historical periods into writing necessitates the omission and curation of material. In order to 
serve any function to the institutions that require such a text, mainly schools and universities, 
it needs to present a comprehensible amount of material and to do so in an efficient way. The 
sources from which many histories derive their information are often unreadable or at least 
uninteresting, as shipping manifests and court documents are not of general interest. What 
occurs then is the omission of “unnecessary” material, the stories deemed frivolous or 
unimportant, and the curation of the remaining material into a condensed, narrativized form. 
Historians like Howard Zinn have addressed the first issue, seeking to dredge up the 
narratives and experiences of those typically ignored by history books – women, people of 
color, the poor. As Walter Benjamin writes, “The chronicler who narrates events without 
distinguishing between major and minor ones acts in accord with the following truth: nothing 
that has ever happened should be regarded as lost to history,” so that the possibility of hope is 
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alive for the use of history for those typically buried in it (390). But the latter issue is one that 
seems unbreachable in any pragmatic sense, for how can a history be shared without being 
translated into a story? It is not that the form is inherently problematic, but that the necessary 
editorializing of material to cohere disparate elements of history into either one or a series of 
grand-narratives necessarily distorts the relationship between historical events and the 
complex material conditions that give rise to them.This impasse is framed by Zukofsky 
through a length of line that leaves the majority of the page blank. A book of history can 
address the events of 2,000 years in half as many pages, and Zukofsky takes on 2,000 years 
(or more) in half as many lines. He is pushing to its absolute limit the ability of the 
methodological practices of curation and omission to convey anything of historical value, 
even doing so on a purely formal, structural level. As a result, Zukofsky shows that history 
may be represented without narrative altogether, privileging the glut of information to be 
accounted for over the coherent curation of that information into a plot-based telling of 
history. 
To give an example in the visual arts, in 1978, American abstract painter-sculptor Cy 
Twombly completed his ambitious ten-work series of paintings entitled Fifty Days at Iliam. 
The paintings “depict” the events of the Trojan War as they were rendered by Alexander 
Pope in his translation of Homer’s The Iliad, but with a total absence of any human-figural 
elements. Instead, what is given is a series of dense concentrations of oil, crayon, and 
graphite accompanied with various linguistic markers of the text: “Hector,” “vengeance,” 
“Ares,” “Like a fire that consumes all before it.” The palette consists mainly of deep reds and 
blues with penciled scrawling tacked on to an untreated canvas, and the result is a loose 
connection with Homer’s original at best. Yet this practice begs the question of what is owed 
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to that original, what kind of proximity to Homer’s imagery that Twombly is obligated to 
 
uphold if this really is the Troy of The Iliad. 
 
A significant choice made by Twombly in this series is his connection to the language 
of the poem. While the events as they are painted resemble what we might recognize as the 
Trojan War, Twombly’s invocation of the concrete markers of Homer’s story – rage, etc. – in 
a purely linguistic fashion calls attention to his curation of words, and, perhaps more 
importantly, the spelling. Twombly spells it “Iliam,” replacing the “u” of the Latin “Ilium” or 
the “o” of the Greek “Ilion” with an “a”. As an explanation of this decision, an insight rare in 
Twombly’s practice of seclusion, he said that the “a” serves to represent, of course, the hero 
Achilles. But to alter the spelling is no small detail, let alone in light of an explanation such 
as this. This act circumscribes the whole story within a single letter, to represent the man, his 
rage, his people. The inscription, ultimately, manifests itself in a single, bloody triangle2, a 
further extrapolation from what was already a reduction of the name to its initial. This 
palimpsestic method of burying the reference in the metamorphosis, the translation, of that 
reference places the emphasis on the affect of the story, the nonrepresentational aspects of 
the tale, flattening to the canvas-plane that whole of history which structures Homer’s tale. It 
gives, using Deleuze’s reading of Francis Bacon, “the horror and not the scream.” It is not 
the narrative of the story that is of importance here (the horror) but the sensation of it (the 
scream), where Twombly depicts the rage and not the war. 
What is the effect of this kind of condensation and turn to sensation? Twombly takes 
the story of Troy and turns it inside of itself. This effect correlates with Viktor Shklovsky’s 
concept of ostranenie or defamiliarization. Twombly’s reorientation and isolation of certain 
 
 
2 See Twombly’s The Vengeance of Achilles (1962) 
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symbols, names, chromatic concepts force readerly reinterpretation of one of the most well- 
known stories of the western world. We would be faulty readers to ignore the source-text 
because of a perceived gulf between original and adaptation, yet the difficulty of connecting 
the two is substantial, symbolically linked to a single shift in “a”. 
But the replacement of “u” for “a” in the title is merely the lower-case echo of 
foregrounding the figure of Achilles himself as written “character” removed from traditional 
historical-artistic representation. By tracing the line from “a” to “A” (a literal elevation), 
Twombly opens up a new consideration of the role that the written, decontextualized word 
plays in “representational” painting. The result of such a move is the turn of the alphabetic 
symbol into figure. The focalization of the letter rises into the forefront of the painting, and 
thus the background of the story runs from sight; it disappears into itself and we are left with 
the isolated figure of the A. Writing on the tendency in Bacon’s paintings to present a single 
subject without landscape, Gilles Deleuze asserts that stories always arise from “the space 
between two figures in order to animate the illustrated whole.” The isolation of one of these 
two figures is the simplest way of breaking with representation, narration, and illustration, in 
order to “liberate the figure: to stick to the fact” (Francis Bacon 6). This “betweenness” may 
exist between subject-figure and background-figure(s), where the relationship of the two 
allows the viewer to take up certain assumptions about the diegesis of the work, attaching the 
previously mentioned scream to its instigating horror. 
This idea comes to fruition in Fifty Days at Iliam by severing the connection between 
representation, especially of the narrative kind, and affect in The Iliad. Realistic depictions of 
the events of the Trojan War are reduced and isolated across the ten canvases. The 
complexity of character and plot in Homer become repetitions of blood, the phallic, names, 
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and Twombly’s characteristic frenzy of mark-making on an otherwise empty, dirty, off-white 
plane. He further reduces the story in the same way that painting reduces reality to two- 
dimensions. 
Twombly, then, is taking the same practice Deleuze identifies in Bacon, most famous 
for his portraits, and extends it to remove narrative altogether. He leaves only the traces of 
the human and its activities which, in this case, is the history of war. The palette itself is 
limited to primary colors in patches, with names and simple geometric shapes in black. 
Therefore, color, too, is removed from its representational mode, even beyond the ways in 
which artists like Rothko or the Fauvists had decontextualized color in painting. The 
geometric shapes are the furthest abstraction of the human figure to line, so that the reality of 
the human is reduced simply to “shape.” In the case of Achilles’ transfiguration into the 
triangle, the person becomes letter, becomes shape, thus becoming-figure through its escape 
from the in-between static space that connects representation to affect. Because of this, 
Achilles becomes multiple all at once: he is letter-as-naming-function, the structural strength 
of the triangular form, phallus, rocket, sword, mountain, and climax. His story is subsumed 
by the vividness of the affect in order to reorient interpretation from the actions of the war to 
the effects. Without this human present anymore, what Fifty Days at Iliam provides is the 
deposit of human violence, the pile of garbage left after the last person takes their last breath, 
as if to say: here is our final tragedy spelled out in blood. 
If Twombly is the artist to elevate the word in painting to the status of a figure, where 
might there be an instance of the word, in its typical context of writing, being elevated passed 
its purely semiotic function, the word-made-object which is propelled from its history to 
speak about itself freely for the first time? The practices of Twombly in painting share a 
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striking resemblance with the late poetic methods of Louis Zukofsky: 1) the reworking of 
historical source material into new artistic expressions of a monstrous body of work which 
resists 1:1 reading between the new and “source” texts; 2) the “objectification” of the word; 
and 3) pushing the limits of the deterritorializing word to disrupt the possibility of 
comprehensive narrative. 
Zukofsky offers a unique and experimental prosody of historical undoing, 
problematizing not only historiography, but demanding the reevaluation of our conceptions 
of words as vehicles for concrete understanding. This chapter will address movements “A”- 
22 and “A”-23 of Zukofsky’s epic from the analytical standpoint of historical representation, 
looking at the ways in which Zukofsky’s poetic methods radically reconceive the necessity of 
linear narrative in history. These two structurally mirrored movements function as bookends 
on either side of the birth of human language. “A”-22 represents the period of geological and 
biological development of the planet prior to the beginning of civilization; “A”-23 represents 
the developments of language and culture since roughly the time of the Sumerians. 
Furthermore, this chapter will establish a reading of Zukofsky’s poetics that opens up the 
interpretation of issues in linear narrative, concrete understanding of language, and the 
proposition of new methods of (re)writing the past. Additionally, by incorporating Gilles 
Deleuze’s linguistic-literary concept of “stuttering” and Walter Benjamin’s concept of 
historical continuum into my reading, I hope to make the case that Zukofsky is 
simultaneously exploring the limits of literary utterance and historical narrative in the 
formation of his late poetics. 
Zukofsky wrote movements “A”-22 and “A”-23, the final movements of “A” to be 
written composed by the author himself, between 1970 and 1974. He began “A”-22 on 
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Valentine’s Day of 1970, completing it on April 14, 1973, and wrote “A”-23 between April 
13th, 1973 and September 21, 1974. In terms of composition, these two movements mark the 
end of Zukofsky’s “poem of a life,” a label he used to describe both the duration of the 
project and the involvement of his own personal life in the poem itself. 
In keeping with this, Zukofsky takes on all life as his subject, and “move(s) outward 
over the whole recorded range of human culture – and beyond that, to the geological and 
natural histories within which that culture had grown and developed” (Scroggins 444). This 
mass of natural and cultural development is not represented as a linear, narrativized history. 
Instead, we may read it as a deposit of the artifacts of history as they are piled up in a 
senseless heap of overlapping, simultaneous phenomena, thereby rupturing the imposed 
narratives of causal history, forcing the practice of historiography to stutter and reveal its 
own limitations. 
Zukofsky himself saw these two movements as a pair of histories (Scroggins 443). 
“A”-22 functions as a surveying of the changing physical landscape of earth, and through the 
poetic description of such development “[h]uman language, and thereby human thought, take 
form within the context of these vast geological processes” (443). Movement 22 lays the 
groundwork for human development by setting the stage with a description of the physical, 
material conditions of the earth, the well from which the later achievements of culture will 
spring. Zukofsky spans the time from the formation of land masses all the way to the present 
writing of the poem. The movement ends with Zukofsky vacationing in Bermuda and reading 
The Tempest by Shakespeare, who was one of the authors most influential to Zukofsky’s own 
writing. These two bookends – volcanic formation and literature – frame the movement as 
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the span of history which shaped and formed the author as a general concept, but more 
importantly the author of “A” himself. 
The two movements work in tandem to give the record of two periods on either side 
of the birth of literature. “A”-23 works as a turn to the human as a subject, or rather human 
production, taking as its focus the development of human language through its literature. 
This movement may be summed up as the “the entire history of human word making,” in a 
more foregrounded sense than “A”-22, which frames speech, philosophy, and wisdom within 
the “prior and more fundamental context” of nature (Scroggins 446). 
“A”-22/23 represent what Scroggins terms the height of Zukofsky’s late poetics. The 
movements of “A” written prior to these two had displayed a wide variety of forms. “A”-1 is 
an example of traditional free verse, without any governing structure or pattern. “A”-7 was 
composed as a series of sonnets. “A”-21 and “A”-24 are a 70-page drama and a 250-page 
masque, respectively. But the paralleled forms of “A”-22 and “A”-23 represent something 
quite distinct from the heterogeneity of the rest of the poem in their relative formal 
simplicity. They function as two monolithic columns through which the reader exits the 
poem. As an illustration of this congruity, I quote them alongside one another, 
“A”-22 
How to write history, policy 
an unteachable gift of nature: 
farmer prophesies better than poet 
two diapasons cleared mutes wrong 
nameless, “not mine” comes from 
the sage calling fig fig (527) 
“A”-23 
Hush seeking oath now go 
brightness pass you, high hill 
lifted hand water anointed rush— 
the labour of the olive 
horses walk thru, the sun 
moon stood, singer stringed instrument. (547) 
 
 
The long, unbroken middle sections of each movement assert a concentrated language that 
affects itself in other movements as sprawling and diverse. Simultaneously, these movements 
cover more ground, so to speak, than any of the other movements combined. This dynamic, 
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between the breadth of content and the condensed language, culminates in a poetics wholly 
unlike any other section of “A”. This condensation of language, or truncated syntax, is the 
prosodic vehicle by which Zukofsky’s interpretation and philosophy of history will show 
itself. 
Its form consists of five-word lines3 totaling 1,000 lines. This body of lines is not 
divided into regular stanzas but instead consists of 1) a kind of overture (for both 22 and 23), 
2) a main body, and 3) a conclusion. Following the inscription, the form of “A”-22 is far 
more regular throughout than any other movements of “A”. The “overture” occupies 103 
lines, within 20 five-line stanzas following the inscription, followed by an 800-line body, and 
then a conclusion of 19 stanzas of five-lines each, with a concluding couplet. I quote them 
here at length in order to give an impression of visual character of the movement, 
no piper lead with nonsense 
before its music don’t, horse, 
brag of faith too much – 
fear thawed reach three-fingered chord 
sweet treble hold lovely – initial 
 
Late later and much later 
surge sea erupts boiling molten 
lava island from ice, land 
seen into color thru day 
and night: voiced, once unheard 
earth beginning idola of years 
that love well forget late 
History’s best left emptied of names’ 
impertinence met on the ways: 
shows then the little earth 
at regard of the heavens 
unfolding tract and flying congregate 
birds their hiding valentine’s day: (511) 
 
 
 
 
 
3 There is at least one exception, the line “are no ties cities feed ruins” (“A” 516) 
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Such a form gives the impression of condensation, elongation, and density. The quantity of 
relatively short lines, without line breaks, convey a feeling of interminability, that the poem 
simply keeps going and going. The proximity of length between lines makes it resolutely 
uniform and thus draws an awareness to its visual and formal consistency. While the five- 
word line scheme implies a visual regularity, it is precisely from this strict rule that Zukofsky 
gives metric variety and complexity to the movement. In some cases, he hyphenates two or 
more words to count as one. A few examples of this move are the lines “fear thawed reach 
three-fingered chord” (511), “men in alembic, consonants with-without” (528), and 
“entombed coppers – merry-go-round, riding ridden” (538). The alembic invoked here 
echoes the process of distillation in Zukofsky’s writing: the transformation of narrative to an 
affect. It is, as Deleuze determined, the horror of history being displayed, not the scream. 
This gives the sense of adding more content than the volume of the container allows, giving 
way to writing with a sense of pressure that grows from the inside. 
Additionally, by structuring the lines by word count, Zukofsky is able to play with the 
syllabic count of the lines in order to create a wide variety of spatial form and temporal 
duration. This manner of varying form and duration within a constrained system of further 
adds to this sense of internal pressure. The pressure also stems from the disjunction of the 
conjoined images, between which any narrative derives. But Zukofsky leaves no room 
between the images, and so any sense of narrative begins to vanish, leaving only the knot of 
paratactic clauses and harshly juxtaposed images. An example of the discrepancy between 
some lines which occur on the same page is the movement from “human cranium’s 
dendritical crystallizations offer” (16) to “skills as of bees in” (the shortest possible 5). This 
difference in syllabic value is illustrative of swaying, variable sense of length where the five- 
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word line serves as a vague boundary to a heterogenous prosody that dances within, a 
relationship reminiscent of the lines “the law, water shaped / to the container it’s in” (523). 
The thought of the poem is, like the water, not altered in its fundamental properties by the 
form, but regulated by it, and only ever externally. But this water may expand, contract, or 
evaporate, and its containment is defined only in part by the material conditions of its 
exterior, for its own physical makeup is also a potentially problematizing force for its 
receptacle. The climate, external even to the receptacle, may cause the water to freeze and the 
glass to shatter. 
“A”-22 begins with the inscription, “AN ERA / ANY TIME / OF YEAR” (508). This 
sets off the movement as one which is opening up to concepts outside of the poet, either of 
this poem or any poet tied to a specific historical moment. By using the indefinite articles of 
“an” and “any”, this poem stages itself as outside of any single concrete moment. Leading 
with the indefinite disrupts the notion that the events occurring in the poem are contingent on 
the linear history which preceded them; it is not a deterministic conception of time. This 
allows for the work to remain hospitable to a multiplicity of interpretations, that the things 
read here may happen at any point, either now, before, or perhaps again. 
In Disjunctive Poetics, Peter Quartermain identifies this inscription as “three 
thoroughly Joycean lines which act out a Viconian reading of history through etymology 
whilst preserving and insisting on the word as object” (105). The inscription implies a 
timelessness of the subsequent lines, and its intrinsic (and perhaps veiled) complexity offers a 
precedent for the kind of reading that should follow. The inscription consists of a 
symmetrical nine vowels and nine consonants. Each line is composed of an article on the left 
side and a time-noun on the right side. This emphasis on synchronicity and numerology 
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(9+9=18) is indicative the personal obsession Zukofsky held with numbers (Quartermain 
107). This immediate tension in balance between weak, inconsequential words (“an,” “any,” 
“of”) and loaded words relating to chronos (era, time, year) when considered alongside the 
equal ratio of vowel to consonant reveals a simultaneous occurrence of balance/imbalance, 
indicating that from an equilibrium of material (the letters) a disequilibrium (in words) arises. 
Quartermain additionally addresses the role of wordplay and etymology in the 
inscription, linking it to the notorious use of both in the work of Joyce (106). If one wishes to 
dive into the history of even one of these words they would inevitably spend quite some time 
and effort before ever reaching the body of the poem itself. For instance, if the reader 
acknowledges the aural aspect of the poem, the word “era” may produce the effect of “air a” 
or “error.” Its Latin origin of aera (recorded numbers or calculations) is invoked as well. 
This speaks to the fascination with quantification in the numerical symmetry of the 
inscription and its inversion of chronological sequence. 
The example here of recorded time (aera) being inscribed etymologically into 
abstract time (era) is a concise illustration of the palimpsestic methods of Zukofsky and his 
desire to enact an entire history in a single word (Quartermain 111). Zukofsky’s writing 
offers a creative engagement with the constraints of history writing by both showing these 
constraints in poetic lines based on necessary concision and simultaneously radically 
reconceptualizing the relationship between the time covered in history writing and the 
historical perspective of the author. In this case, then, time is only the written account of 
itself; it is only the self-reflexive signifier and never the signified. He is able to problematize 
and bring to light the notion that this abstract time somehow only springs from having 
already been written. It is, in other words, an internal contradiction, because the recorded 
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time becomes “time” only upon its recording. Therefore, there is not an absolute, or ideal, 
 
state of that time, and historical time is a construction grounded in the writing of history. 
 
This opportunity for creative, combinatorial reading, condensed into six words, is like 
a microcosm of “A” as a whole as it serves as an illustration for the difficulties inherent to 
any reading of the poem. The many paths which Zukofsky’s writing opens up to lead you out 
and around before making it very far down the page. In his monograph on “A”, Barry  
Ahearn writes that despite the poem’s difficulty, readers may “follow the music” of it as one 
way of getting a sense of “A” and its workings. While the allure of this method is tempting, 
he writes, one may still “sift content from the rubble,” with the caveat that “Prospectors 
should be warned, however, that intellectual fatigue soon sets in” (Ahearn 181). The 
possibilities that the inscription to “A”-22 is capable of producing in a close reading show 
that it is crucial to not only follow the music, but to sift through the rubble as well. 
Through the ambiguity of the inscription, Zukofsky puts forth a model of recurring 
time. As early as “A”-2, Zukofsky makes the first of many references to “liveforever,” a 
common name for a genus of perennial plants, Sempervivium (7). At the beginning of “A”-22 
this invocation of the plant is echoed in the longing to “let me live here ever, / sweet now” 
(508). Although these two movements were written decades apart, the recursion of the image 
in “A”-22 creates a sense of simultaneity between them. This sensation is even more striking 
when we consider that “let me live here ever” is a reference to The Tempest. By reaching to 
connect even further in the past with the work of another author, Zukofsky showcases the 
poem’s desire and capacity to accommodate and absorb history and writing outside of itself. 
This desire to live presently in light of the proposition put forth by the opening three lines 
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that this exploration is occurring in a nonspecific time seems to imply a desire to live 
amongst the things of history at once. 
If “sweet now” is always (“ever”), then we need not differentiate between historical 
moments as points on a ray extending outward. Instead, we may understand them as affects 
experienced only as such in a singular present moment, a moment of permanent infinitude, 
and thus distinct from a marching, non-repeating time. It is as if Zukofsky is advocating for a 
conception of time monistically instead of taking any one cross-section of historical time as a 
source of inquiry. Therefore, the opening issue of the subject’s relationship to progress in 
“A”-22 is the first problem to address in determining further any aspect of Zukofsky’s image 
of history, in order to comprehend Zukofsky’s model of history as now. 
 
 
Zukofsky’s Now 
 
The characteristics of “A”-22 discussed thus far – its form, inscription, and 
characterization of time – render its contents and images into a deposit, or heap, of historical 
materials and events that occur all at once, and all the time. In the overture to “A”-22, 
Zukofsky writes of a “hectic of an instant” (509), and I would argue that this is perhaps the 
most apt self-description that occurs in the poem. This line conveys the chaos which occurs 
in each moment as these histories are reenacted and made new. These reenactments take 
many forms: speech, memory, reading, writing (with “A” as an example), monuments, as 
well as the repetitions of any of these acts. In a textual-material sense, we may understand 
“A”, despite its great length, as this kind of hectic instant, where history crashes together in 
the now. 
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Zukofsky gives his own image of the perceiving subject perched from the present 
vantage point to look back down and arrest a frame of that history, therein, 
thinking of a thought 
not his thought, older complexities: 
the fractional state of the 
annals (512) 
 
In this passage, Zukofsky opens with the indefinite quality of “a thought,” emphasized 
through italics. He acknowledges that the thought comes from elsewhere while 
simultaneously implying that the thought’s presence in the present is precisely derived from 
the thinking-borrower of that thought: it is not his thought but occurs now only because of 
him. The thought, of “older complexities,” is something dredged back up because it remains 
unresolved. The state of history is “fractional,” which seems to imply that, although not 
whole, that a denominator is known. The result of such a predicament is a cross-historical 
intellectual link, for which there is “no key to the tangle” (“A” 518). 
It is in Zukofsky’s enacting of this principle that we may see how the annihilation of 
the concept of progress may look. Zukofsky’s “hectic of an instant” is the disruption of 
causality in history. Each moment is its own system of flux, so that between these moments 
there is also only a hectic relationship, and any progressive sense of history is undermined in 
favor of a chaotic one. As in the “Star-Gate” sequence of Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, 
Zukofsky’s language produces the effect of a barrage of images flashing rapidly across a 
screen, the poet’s eye as a lens. One instance of this in “A”-22 is a catalogue of botanical, 
geological, and zoological phenomena, and follows the preface of “if created Once (a 
thought) / or thought of consecutively…” (513). The list reads, 
… fossiliferous 
marl saved froghopper, ladybird, glowworm, 
red admiral, mingling in dredged 
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lake mud, anachronous stone, horn, 
bone, jade, an armlet’s brass 
wire, flax plaited, not woven, 
carbonized apple, raspberry, blackberry seed, 
wild plum drupe, reindeer antler 
nowhere, remains of a larger 
hunting dog, a forest pony, 
a burnt brick, and round 
small bodies… 
… might have been 
strung together as beads, the 
bond that united them unbroken. (513) 
 
It is in the spirit of this discussion of the conception of history that Walter Benjamin becomes 
so relevant, and his 1940 essay, “On the Concept of History,” incomplete at the time of his 
death, proves to be a catalyzing supplement. This is especially true when considered through 
Zukofsky’s writing of a history poem wherein things are considered and presented “at once,” 
impossibly entangled, and without rigid narrative. Benjamin’s project to reconceptualize 
historical time is useful for reading how Zukofsky’s abstractions are taking up similar 
concerns but in the poetic realm. 
The issue of history, for both Benjamin and Zukofsky, is never a purely academic 
affair, and there are stakes to its inherent problems that become particularly evident in key 
historical moments. Both writers lived during the Second World War, and Benjamin, fearing 
capture at the approaching Vichy/Spanish front, tragically died before its end. Zukofsky, 
witnessing these horrors of the war from the other side of the Atlantic, gave a good deal of 
space to the war in the earlier books of “A”, as in “A”-10’s depiction of the fall of Paris: 
“Mass, massed refugees on the roads / Go to mass with the air / and the shrapnel for a 
church” (112). The timeliness of Benjamin’s writing on history speaks precisely to the role 
that history plays in contemporary political events, emphasizing that history is not a harmless 
thing that has been transcended and that, in fact, it is actually a powerful tool that has yet to 
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be seized and utilized by anyone other than the dominant class. Zukofsky takes this concern 
to poetry, where the epic poem is refashioned to occupy itself with historical realities, rather 
than propagandistic national origin stories. 
Benjamin first takes as his task the distinguishing between the methods and 
ideologies of historicists and historical materialists, advocating with hope of productive 
potential for those of the latter. His overarching concern is with the view of the past as a 
continuum, and he cites Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus as an illustration of the historical 
perspective necessary to make political use of history in the present, to look back at history 
not as a “chain of events” but as “one single catastrophe” (Benjamin 392). Zukofsky 
accordingly treats the history of “A”-22 not as the string of causalities but rather as a singular 
plane; an incomprehensible mess to sift through; the “rubble on top of rubble” that piles at 
the feet of the angel. 
Zukofsky’s tangle may be thought of as that “single catastrophe” that Benjamin 
identifies with Klee’s angel of history. Zukofsky’s figure stands at the limit of the past, 
looking back at the “wreckage,” as Benjamin labels it, of the “fractional state”. And like the 
angel, this figure “would like to stay, awaken up the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed” (Benjamin 392). Perhaps he lacks a key to the tangle of these older thoughts as 
they relate to the present, seeking to redeem these thoughts only as they may be redeemed 
across history. 
But this recorded thought of history is one that propels the figure forward through 
time without the opportunity to make sense of that entanglement. The force that prevents him 
from staying in place to redeem that past is what Benjamin identifies as the notion of 
progress (392). The cause-and-effect view of history as a linear progression of events which 
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occur resolutely makes this redemption an impossible task. While Zukofsky’s figure is 
depicted in terms of desiring to make himself and his thought one with those of the past, 
there is the sense that the gulf cannot be bridged. These “older complexities” are thoughts 
that belong to the books, and so long as these books are viewed solely as a part of the past, 
without an urgent relevance to the now, the problem will remain. To allow thought to be 
defined by the parameters of a dislocated, historical idea is to give oneself up to perpetual 
dislocation between oneself and that history. 
Instead, Zukofsky is able to conceive of a language which attempts to enact, from a 
new angle, a radically revised vision of history as it pertains to the present historical moment. 
He writes, 
…Truth’s way all one 
Where it begins and shall 
Come back again thru traceless 
Now (517) 
 
Here Zukofsky conceives of truth, and by extension history, as a unity. In this philosophy, 
the beginning and return of things are one, passing through the “traceless / Now.” They 
remain inseparable by virtue of being thought at-once, and always in the present. This notion 
is illustrated later in “A”-22 through Zukofsky’s “peasant gardener” whose plants he “prefers 
to greet by ancient names” (535). The gardener and these ancient names are collapsed in 
time, which is in contrast to the gardener who employs modern botanical terminology, 
mistaking the newer terms as evidence of progress in understanding. 
Charles Bernstein links Zukofsky’s late poetics to Benjamin’s now-time in a 1992 
talk entitled, “Before Time: For David Antin.” He identifies “how plot and story can really 
steal this now-time.” This theft derives itself from the narrativization of experience, a process 
which necessitates plotting events along a chronological line. Storytelling is inherently 
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dangerous to the redemption of now-time because of this fundamental adherence to plot.4 
Bernstein echoes the early description of perception in relation to the formation of earth’s 
landmass in “A”-22, where land is “seen into color.” He recalls an ancient time when “poets’ 
words called that sentient world into being.” Bernstein emphasizes the role that language and 
perception have always played in relation to the world as a perceived field, to the extent that 
this field is an actual result of that new capacity to perceive. 
This unintelligible, rigidly irrelevant thought viewed separate from the present serves 
as the model for Benjamin’s conception of the difference between the historical materialist 
and the historicist, for as he posits, 
The historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present which is not a 
transition, but in which time takes a stand [einsteht] and has come to a standstill. For 
this notion defines the very present in which he himself is writing history. Historicism 
offers the ‘eternal’ image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique 
experience with the past (396) 
 
For Zukofsky, a similar fallacy occurs when “Scribes conceive history as tho / sky, sun, men 
never were” (522). The danger in this kind of history is the total removal of the historical 
subject(s) from the reality of the present, where the subject is narrativized and abstracted 
almost to the extent of becoming a fiction. This conception of the relationship between 
history and writing may be further understood as a link between form and information. “Sky, 
sun, men” are not treated as they were, but are instead reduced to a kind of disembodied data. 
Referring back to the inscription of the movement, the etymological relationship between 
“era” and “aera” (recorded numbers and calculations) takes on new stakes as it becomes clear 
that this conception of time necessarily involves the reduction of life into information. 
 
4 Even instances of “non-linear” storytelling fall into this trap. The disruptions of chronology in a text, such as 
in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest, are only effective because of their resistance to linear time. If anything, 
by telling a story in a such a manner, the concept of chronology is reinforced. It is not the order of things, but 
the narrative that pervades them. 
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This conception of history is framed as a static re-recapitulation. It does not grant 
them life, only permanence of death, always already lost to history (though we know they are 
not). These “men never were” insofar as that which is made rigid by historical abstraction is 
robbed of ever having lived. By virtue of severing these subjects from the organic field of 
matter which had given them life, the historicist disconnects between the image of life and 
life itself. This is true even the great figures of history, as Zukofsky writes that “Callous 
stone men great names / are too late if ties / are no ties” (516). The “great names” are 
monumentalized and decontextualized through abstraction from the vital forces which 
defined them as a part of reality. 
This past that Benjamin calls for us to reclaim is one that may “be seized only as an 
image that flashes up at the moment of its recognizability, and is never seen again” (390). 
This moment of recognizability emphasizes the “moment of danger” and redirects the 
relevance of history from a cold retelling of the past towards the kairotic, present moment, 
wherein one may wrestle up a buried part of that history to liberate it, however briefly. This 
notion is furthered by Zukofsky, who asserts that we eschew these “older complexities” of 
others’ thoughts, “For now it is: not / is the same and can / be thought and thought is / now” 
(517). Zukofsky’s now-thought thus resonates with Benjamin’s concept of “now-time” 
(Jetzeit). Of now-time, Benjamin posits that history is not comprised of “homogenous, empty 
time, but time filled full by now-time” which is attained through “tremendous abbreviation,” 
and produces the model of messianic time (396). Zukofsky dredges up these “older 
complexities,” through the collapsing of ideas, figures, and events, so that “thought is / now,” 
and so contracts time across massive periods. This abbreviation is Benjamin’s weak 
messianism, the reclamation of history’s Jetzeit. 
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This understanding of history is capable of mending that vital connection between the 
past and the present, that “hectic of an instant.” Here, the former is not an inactive subject but 
one that offers a way out through its potential to shock contemporary consciousness out of its 
linearity via this messianic time. Zukofsky illustrates a hope for a mending of past and 
present, 
child learns on blank paper, 
an old man rewrites palimpsest, 
a good heart dejected brings 
others peace, asks no returns, 
assumes milestones guide all and 
belong to each so no 
one people can claim to 
excel. (525) 
 
For Zukofsky, the disparate relations of the spatio-temporal duration of various subjects is 
nonconsequential to their ability to harmonize, which requires a perspective that eliminates 
hierarchies relating to agency and value. An alternative perspective is conceptualized in the 
lines “not small for the greatest / not great for the smallest / merely a tree’s highest branches” 
(520). The notion of understanding things not through ordering-by-comparison, but by 
treating things as they were and always are hearkens to Zukofsky’s concepts of perfectly 
capturing historical particulars as previously discussed in relation to “A”-6. The old man, 
representative of the contemporary individual, is able to compose through layering and 
simultaneity. In Benjamin’s terms, he fulfills the promise made with the past by resolving the 
distance from it, sharing the “milestones” which “guide all” and denunciating any claim that 
“one people,” either historical or contemporary, rises above the rest. 
This echoes Benjamin’s sentiment that people are never lost to history; they are only 
suppressed through its machinations at the hands of dominant powers. In hist poetry, 
Zukofsky posits a relationship between different temporalities as an opportunity to create 
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new connections and produce new affects. In fact, the opening of the first movement of “A” 
alludes to this very phenomenon of time-leaping affiliation when the poet attends a 
performance of Bach, 
The Passion According to Matthew, 
Composed seventeen twenty-nine, 
Rendered at Carnegie Hall, 
Nineteen twenty-eight, 
Thursday evening, the fifth of April. 
The autos parked, honking. (1) 
 
Following this description of almost two centuries colliding together, the poet-figure emerges 
from the collision as if from a revelation: “I lit a cigarette, and stepped free / Beyond the red 
light of the exit” (2). While the concert has ended, he leaves “free” with a newfound 
awareness of his proximity to the past, goes home, and begins writing the poem we are 
reading. It is a connection born purely from subjective association, as if the line drawn is 
significant by virtue of its mere happening. Through the temporal juxtaposition of these two 
dates – 1729 and 1928 – and the metapoetic move of depicting the significance of the 
inspiration to begin the poem within the text itself, Zukofsky creates a new framework of 
historical poetics which foregrounds the contemporary experience of the historical. Through 
this poetics he is capable of collapsing time in order to bring about new readings from the 
collision. Anachronism is not a concern here, for it is far more important that we find here  
the potential for these collisions to reconcile the present with the past in order to restore the 
now-time. 
Returning to an invocation of the inscription to “A”-22, Zukofsky writes, “now 
summer happy new year / any time of year – so” (“A” 511). Summer and new year are 
opposed but set as occurring whenever so that the cyclical time of the seasons and calendar 
begins to merge with the simultaneity of “any time of year”. We wait a little while, and 
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they’re back. But last summer, last year are not gone – no – they simply rest beneath, tinting 
that which is occurring in the moment: “I wonder if this one’ll be as hot as the last.” The 
“older complexities” creep back up, over and over, each time becoming older and more 
complex. It is an unfolding that gains in richness as it weaves further these new materials, 
reaching to connect and continue becoming-with each new and newer (and always old) 
intensity which shoots out from that whirling time. For instance, here I stand writing of the 
older complexities yet again. 
The ending conjunction of “any time of year – so”, rests on the other side of the dash. 
 
The non-conjoining conjunction indicates a point of departure at the realization, or rather, 
from the realization of time as a kind of launch pad or a dock which delineates the boundary 
or limit between the catalogued and the chaotic, the striated and the smooth spaces5. The 
movement from one category to the other, as in the cases of Twombly or Bacon, is 
reminiscent of the disruption of order to which Benjamin attributes the possibility of 
reformulating how history is made to work. 
Applied in terms of poetics, this disruption requires the birth of new formal strategies 
which are able “to make the continuum of history explode” (Benjamin 395). In the case of 
“A”, the strategies for such a disruption are multivalent. In the same way that the Language 
Poets later sought to prioritize the mechanics of language, Zukofsky takes vocabulary, 
grammar, syntax, form, sound, etc. and deploys them as a means to show the seams of 
language. These moments of homophonic play, shifting syntax, and ambiguous subject/verb 
relations push the language to the point of an eruption. The failure of language to 
accommodate this poetics is an indication of an upper limit of its capacity to convey meaning 
 
5 See Deleuze and Guattari, from “On Several Regimes of Signs,” in A Thousand Plateaus (1987, trans. Brian 
Massumi) 
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through traditional means. But at the same time, it is precisely the moment where a new, 
revolutionary kind of communication begins to show itself. 
This is not an oppositional kind of reaction; for to be such would be to adhere to the 
forces which shape thought and becoming by defining itself in the negative. Instead, 
Zukofsky pushes the constraints of language to show the extent to which it can 
accommodate, rather than exclude, radical forms of expression. What is necessary in order to 
resist the codification and institutionalization of expressive forms is to maintain 
experimentation, to move chaotically with respect to that dominant force, to sneak around 
behind it and give it a scare. In this sense, it is not of importance to re-narrativize histories of 
progress with preference given to subordinated classes, but to rattle the whole machine and 
show its malfunctions before it is adapted and repaired to accommodate the disruption. The 
history narrative grounded on any idea of progress “recognizes only the progress in 
mastering nature, not the retrogression of society; it already displays the technocratic features 
that later emerge in fascism” (Benjamin 393). 
The scope of Zukofsky’s survey, eons of time, speaks to a desire to rescue and 
revitalize the entirety of humanity from the rubble behind him, if only briefly. The result is 
not the exploration of human development, but the totalizing conditions of that development, 
as one massive machine encompassing both nature and culture as inseparable concepts. If 
“history’s best left emptied of / names’ impertinence” then there is no use in giving the 
history of what Benjamin terms the “victors.” The celebration of individual heroes, 
undoubtedly a key trait of the traditional epic tale, is abandoned, towards the total 
“dissolution of the subject,” a concept Daniel Smith discusses in his introduction to 
Deleuze’s Essays Clinical and Critical (xxiv). In its stead, Zukofsky conceives of a 
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restructured history which seeks to embrace the unity of things, large and small, as intricately 
interconnected and without hierarchy. In this sense he ties issues of history writing with the 
role that history has historically played in the epic poem by spending a great deal of time on 
the prehistoric. Quoting it again at length for the ease of reference, the main body of “A”-22 
begins, 
Late later and much later 
surge sea erupts boiling molten 
lava island from ice, land 
seen into color thru day 
and night: voiced, once unheard 
earth beginning idola of years 
that love well forget late 
History’s best left emptied of names’ 
impertinence met on the ways (511) 
 
The emphasis of this scene occurring “later”, of time having passed, positions whatever 
comes after it, yet unknown, as only ever being contingent on the past which gave shape to it. 
Zukofsky illustrates the emergence of “lava island from ice” (my emphasis) so that a direct 
connection between two divergent images is presented as a logical outcome. The formation 
of these natural processes, in their chaos, allows for an almost infinite number of possible 
outcomes of landscape and biological evolution. So while it is a statistically miracle, it is also 
inevitable that from this chaos arises, without any claim to elevated status, the human 
subject. 
This subject is introduced not by its figuration or embodiment but through its capacity 
to perceive, as land is “seen into color.” In this case the perception of land is the catalyst for 
the conception of its color, and the beginning of color as a quality of human perception. This 
emergent, seeing subjectivity, still unheard, gives shape as well to the articulation of the 
experience of time passing. Zukofsky writes in “A”-12 that “In Hebrew ‘In the Beginning’ / 
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Means literally from the head?” (142). The interrogative tone of these lines intimates a 
confusion at the idea that there was nothing there before there was a human mind to perceive 
it. As the inscription at the beginning of the movement suggests, time itself is only the 
product of its recording. This is at odds with the pre-human landscape wherein time is 
characterized by its smoothness, not its division but its movement of “Late later and much 
later.” But when this voice “once unheard” emerges, it engenders somehow that first idola, 
that first thought (or fallacy?), setting forth the first product of thought in the decree that 
history was better off without the naming-function which gives a veil of essence by virtue of 
positioning itself at the beginning of things. Although writing of a different medium, 
Deleuze’s determination that the modern painter is only born when they cease to experience 
themselves as an essence and begin to do so as an accident is equally applicable to the poem 
that erases signs of self-creation in favor of pure acts of creation which are precipitated 
instead from the becoming of that accident and not an immanent determination (Bacon 101). 
Having drawn a line around Benjamin and Zukofsky, and circling their kindred 
thinking on a productive perspective on the past, we may move from reading history for what 
limitations it places on itself, and societies tethered to it, and turn toward the literary methods 
that disrupt that tradition. Zukofsky’s project takes the byproducts of that history and makes 
them new as a means to triangulate an upper limit to its potentiality of use-value; to fulfill 
that pact Benjamin claims we’ve made with the past, to explode that which runs the risk of 
disappearing out of the daisy chain of historicism. The task remains incomplete, or is at least 
stalled, if we resign to the diagnosis of inadequacies in historiography, only to wallow in its 
impossibilities. It is thus necessary to conceive of concepts or frameworks in language and 
writing which may disrupt the linear flow of history and, in order to do so, I find it useful to 
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introduce another theoretical element to the problem at hand through some of the writing of 
Gilles Deleuze concerning language and regimes of signs. 
 
 
“A”-23 – A Stuttering History 
 
The remainder of this chapter will shift to a focus on Zukofsky’s “A”-23 and the 
ways in which the concepts of history addressed above are carried out in the poetic language 
used to include history, as followed through the history of literature. The movement from 
“A”-22 “A”-23 here is useful as the latter represents a history of language and literature, 
whereas the former detailed the time leading up to it. Zukofsky’s interpretation of the 
trajectory of western literature is as iconoclastic as his treatment of the formation of modern 
geology and the birth of human perception. As “A”-22 framed history as these natural 
developments giving way to the advent of literature, with the poet reading Shakespeare, “A”- 
23 follows the line from oral poetry to the construction of “A” itself. 
The primary theory incorporated for this is the work of Gilles Deleuze in Essays 
Critical and Clinical, as well as his collaborations with Félix Guattari in “On Several 
Regimes of Signs,” from A Thousand Plateaus, and What is Philosophy? By putting 
Zukofsky’s poetics into conversation with the theories of language and signs of Deleuze and 
Guattari, it is possible to develop further a conception of poetry’s capacity to disrupt systems 
of language and, in application, practices of history writing. To do so will necessitate a look 
at the formal and technical aspects of the poems not as they illuminate historical 
representation but as they problematize the language. In turn, a focus will rest on syntax, 
form, enjambment, pronoun-use, and homophony. If “A”-22 articulated a goal of unifying 
history in its difference, “A”-23 hypothesizes a use of language that approaches that goal. 
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While in the trajectory of “A”-22 Zukofsky devotes most of his space to the natural processes 
of the earth, it is, from the beginning, only ever understood through human perception. So 
although the “order” of history is framed as the movement from the natural to the human, the 
language used to illustrate the scene is always constructing the natural as an exterior force. 
In “The Landscape of Sensation,” Ronald Bogue addresses the Deleuzian concepts of 
the house and the cosmos. In this formulation, the house represents “scaffolding that delimits 
and frames forces,” where the cosmos “is ultimately unframed and without limits, a plane 
that extends into infinity” (18). The house is the regulating force of the cosmos, through 
which the intersecting parts of the cosmos-plane pass. Most of the essay concerns the 
discussions of landscape representation in painting, but in the conclusion, Bogue turns to 
literature, writing that, “creates ‘nonhuman landscapes of nature,’ hallucinatory images at the 
limits of language, visions interconnected with sonic auditions… perhaps no art is more 
devoted to overcoming itself than literature” (Bogue 25). Sensation, the ultimate, lasting 
aspect of the arts “is not the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of 
man’s nonhuman becomings, and of the ambiguous house that exchanges and adjusts them, 
makes them whirl around like winds” (What is Philosophy? 183). We might understand 
history as the cosmos and literature as the house through which the former passes and is 
transformed. Literature is the means by which the massive glut of history is filtered through 
language and circulated; it is how we write about the way things have been, whether fictive 
or not. Now I turn to literature, that other history, in order to survey how these structuring 
forces contribute to the construction of that newer conception of history. 
“A”-23 loosely takes the form of a history of western literature. It “begins” with the 
 
invocation of an Arapaho song, moving through the Epic of Gilgamesh and Homer, and then 
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addresses a slew of canonical European and American writers like Chaucer, Shakespeare, 
Wordsworth, Byron, and Henry James. However, towards the end of the movement, 
Zukofsky’s own writing from earlier movements of “A” enters. This is not so much the 
history of literature, but a history of literature as curated by the poet. That it ends with so 
much of Zukofsky’s writing leads to the idea that this trajectory is about the writing that 
influences and ultimately culminates in “A”. This is a source of references for understanding 
the poem and the intertextuality of its language and style. However, as Scroggins writes of 
Zukofsky’s “late citation”, these sources “were important to the poet, they have a decisive 
impact on the poem as it stands in its finished form, but they are not—cannot be—the master 
key to poem’s interpretation (423). Like “A”-22, this movement is constructed on a principle 
of cyclicality and simultaneity, but whereas the former sought to justify this principle in 
actual time, “A”-23 eliminates the aspect of sequential time altogether and treats the 
language as one big heap, and only ordered as it makes sense to the poet at hand. 
From the start of this movement we can see that the whole of “A” begins to come full 
circle. The movement opens “An unforeseen delight a round / beginning ardent; to end blest / 
presence less than nothing thrives” (536), which calls back to the very opening of the poem: 
“A / Round of fiddles playing Bach” (1). This emphasis on the “round,” the musical term for 
performing in staggered unison, characterizes the work as one which harmonizes with itself. 
Although textually the poem performs itself in one long sequence, these kinds of references 
to its own (intra)textuality show that the work is resonating with various pieces 
simultaneously. While one may not have considered the round since the opening of the poem, 
at this point, though the introduction is not on the page, it is called back up in the mind. The 
feeling of “at once” that pervades the whole of “A”-22 reaches its pitch as the double-ness 
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forms between himself and his younger self. “A”-23’s first lines, in invoking the opening of 
“A”, recycles of parts of the poem in this movement in a manner as fugue-like as the Bach 
piece which inspired its very composition. 
In the last five-line stanza before the main body of the movement, Zukofsky makes 
the explicit turn from the political history of “A”-18 and the natural history of “A”-22 
towards something else. He writes, 
the saving history 
not to deny the gifts 
of time where those who 
never met together may hear 
this other time sound one (539) 
 
Of these lines, Ahearn writes “Human history, natural history, and now this mysterious 
‘saving history.’ What is it? … The saving history is poetry: ‘saving’ as in ‘remembering’ 
and ‘salvation.’” (Ahearn 193). Zukofsky sees poetry as a form of art with the capacity, not 
only to unite history, but to dredge up past figures and save them. But to strive to call back 
into memory those of the past so that they “may hear / this other time sound one” is indeed a 
project of linguistic salvation. If language is the force by which reality is constructed, then it 
is the language of history that must be revised as much as the perspective of historical 
writing: the how of writing as much as the what. 
This echoes with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the postsignifying regime, 
derived from the chapter “On Several Regimes of Signs.” Defined as “passional” not 
“ideational,” the postsignifying regime is action and emotion, not idea (ATP 120). This 
distinction is characterized by Deleuze and Guatarri through the contrasting images of the 
prophet and the priest, with the former representing the postsignifying. Using the story of 
Jonah as an example, Deleuze and Guattari identify how Jonah, by trying to defy the will of 
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God and leaving for sea fulfills that will perfectly (122-3). Jonah, by defying God fulfills his 
task. This notion correlates back to the prior discussion of Benjamin, where Zukofsky as 
Jonah, tries to escape a traditional history but in doing so fulfills a redemptive pact with the 
past, thereby restoring that weak messianic power of now-time. It calls up that group of 
people – the ones still buried in history – and brings them into being for the very first time. 
They reenter into a 
A world worn in whose 
Happiest reigns preempt their histories 
 
Which cannot help or hurt 
A foreseen curve where many 
Loci would dispose and and’s 
Compound creature and creature together (536) 
 
This is an illustration of Zukofsky’s compounding treatment of history. It represents the 
rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari through its’ “and.. and.. and…” It disrupts the ordering and 
hierarchical model of the tree, whereby historical subjects are arranged as stemming from 
one source. For Zukofsky, the order is not so linear; here, many loci arrange the relationships 
of these subjects, and the creatures are linked, not ordered. 
Following the 100-line introduction, “A”-23 commences its literary history. Zukofsky 
starts this middle section with the transliteration of an Arapaho song: “Ye nó we see hay / io 
we hay we see / hay io we sée no” (539). The words, for the most part, are words that readers 
in English would recognize – we, no, hay, see – yet the text eludes meaning for those who do 
not understand the language. In the middle of this passage there is the parenthetical 
“(windsong bis)” (539). “Bis” refers to the repetition of a musical phrase. Similar to the use 
of “a round,” the direction to repeat here signals something different. If this passage, which 
represents the beginning of orality in poetry, is to repeat itself, then it means that the function 
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of orality is to resound even as that passage of text is left behind and the reader moves 
forward. The musical terminology is at odds with the literary form and creates a tension with 
the latter’s modal limitations; the way text works is sequential, syntagmatic. But here, the 
text is telling itself, or the reader, to imagine the text repeating even as new text is 
encountered. This is an aesthetic “piling up” of historical accumulation, where the art of the 
past continues resonating with and into the present as new work is created, which is mimetic 
of the treatment of time in “A”-22. It imagines itself as a text, but with a capacity to 
incorporate non-literary. At the same time, this call-for-repetition insinuates a historical 
function akin to Benjamin’s notion of progress. 
Zukofsky structures his history not chronologically but poetically. The Arapaho song 
would clearly have been dated later than the Sumerian poem, but because the latter is a 
recorded text, it is positioned after the song, as another textual evolution toward the poem 
“A”. This emphasis on movement and beginnings is distinct from the traditional notion of 
progress in that it makes no qualitative claims. It’s not that things get better, but that time just 
moves and accumulates more and more material, which in this case is nothing more than a 
source of inspiration. An illustration of this occurs at the outset of the movement, where 
Zukofsky writes, 
Nothing: unstopping motion whose smallest 
note further divided would serve 
nothing – destined actual infinitely initial, 
how dire this honor who’ll 
peddle nothing: rederned this requiem 
alive (538) 
This is a process of constant beginning, the “unstopping motion” of accumulation of 
“infinitely initial” creations. Furthermore, the emphasis here of nothing, undoes any notion of 
Rowe 67 
 
inherent significance in reality. It is not about value necessarily but about the processes of 
multiplying, not dividing through time. Its value comes from its miraculousness of being, that 
if even one further division of its time were to occur then the whole thing would be undone. 
This echoes an early description of the network of materials of the universe, characterized as 
a “A heaven of stones whose / Swiftness made their separate orbits / One, that slackening 
would fall (518). It is the energy they share, propelling them, that unifies, not any 
significance that is shared. 
By structuring the history this way, Zukofsky allows his own guiding principles to 
string histories together like beads, so that the orality of the Arapaho song then pervades into 
recorded literature. This orality is even how the retelling of the Epic of Gilgamesh is started. 
It begins, “Praise! gill . . gam . . mesh . .” (540). In this line, the name is broken down 
syllabically, so that each part resembles an English word. We have here the sensation of the 
original language being conjured through the English tongue. Returning to the dialectic of 
Bach/Zukofsky in “A”-1, this passage collapses even more time: the earliest existing 
recorded text coming through the mouth of the poet almost 4,000 years later, melded together 
as one. 
Their temporal discrepancies are ignored in favor of their poetic coexistence, so that 
“Tongues commonly inaccurate talk viable / one to one, ear to / eye loving song greater than/ 
anything (537). The “ear to / Eye” signals a transition from orality to textuality. This is the 
beginning of material writing as an aspect of the poetic text. But this is not a qualitative shift. 
Instead, the concomitant eye and ear have now joined in the process of poetic interpretation, 
so that rather than considering them as two separate epochs, we may think of their 
conjunction as a more complex and rich opportunity of interpretation. 
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The retelling of the Epic of Gilgamesh closes the pre-European section of the history 
by invoking the concept of the infinite within a musing on death. This epic, as a vestige of a 
past civilization, still echoes through today as a beginning of storytelling. But Zukofsky, 
hesitant of storytelling, removes its names (other than the first deconstruction of Gilgamesh’s 
name) and obscures its features to the point that it simply melds into his own narrative-less 
text. It concludes, 
… “How 
can I, fatal. Eternal’s forever, 
everlasting came after, and no 
part-fulness contracts forever. Or 
it’s as you look: only 
the dragonfly’s unformed wings wait 
the sun for its glory. 
I outlived a flood to 
be called everlasting, to know 
distant partings of tidal river, 
asleep and dead grow alike. 
Take home my gift, my 
secret, the plant you shall 
name, this journey as under 
water, ‘Alive-Old-Stay-Young.’” (543) 
 
This final advice given to Gilgamesh speaks to the whole project of “A” in its celebration of 
a kind of eternal life distinct from “immortality.” This solution is textuality, as in 
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 15. “I outlived a flood to / be called everlasting” implies that it is not 
literally everlasting, but called that, through the transmission of that story. I read this not as a 
contradiction to the anti-narrative elements of “A” but as a testament to how literature and 
texts keep echoing beyond their time and even their cultures. “A” is the proof of that 
everlasting quality, even if the aim of this epic differs from the original. 
The remainder of the movement is a barrage of literary references that would require 
their own chapter to catalogue and explicate. They span from copious nods to Chaucer, the 
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Romantics, the Chapman translation of Homer, to Enlightenment-era philosophical and 
scientific text, as well as references to the musical. What is significant here, however, is the 
breadth of scope and speed at which Zukofsky moves through these historical figures and 
their texts. Two or more authors may be referenced in a single line in an almost palimpsestic 
fashion. At several moments, “A” seems to be even tripping over itself, as the already 
condensed lines breakdown entirely into ellipses: “don’t it know .. naturally . . Pride . . / 
Daughter of Riches . . the Republick / of Dogs . . the Many . . usurps / sympathy” (561) 
characterized further on by the line “Jubilant agony too too sped (562). This produces a 
tension between the content of the poem and its own (in)ability to keep up with the pace of 
that content. The employment of such a parataxis, the disjunctive syntax, foreground 
language as it stutters. Although it may be grammatically incorrect, these paratactic methods 
which race the poem through itself produces opportunities to reconsider the value of an 
incorrect syntactic structure. It is emblematic of Deleuze’s ideas concerning “the creation of 
syntax,” in the essay “Literature as Life,” which “brings about not only a decomposition of 
destruction of the maternal language, but also the invention of a new language within 
language” (Essays Clinical and Critical 5). Zukofsky reinvents new ways of operating within 
language in the same way that he restructures historical representation. 
Literature plays a role in “A” beyond just lineage of the vehicle for language. It 
illustrates a method of reading, interpreting, and incorporating other concepts across time. It 
is a poem that does not prescribe but absorbs. Therefore, the notion of the singular, Romantic 
creative genius is erased in favor of the poet who lets himself dissolve in the history of 
literature in order to produce something new, making no claims of pure authenticity or 
solipsism. Poet-critic Barrett Watten writes that in “A” 
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the self is corrected, reflexive, to begin with. There is an immediate need to fit a 
‘noncanonized’ individual into the dominant literary forms. Zukofsky’s poetics 
are the poetics of an assimilation … the poem itself stands as a thing outside, a 
musical whole. (Total Syntax 33-34) 
 
This assimilation is perhaps one of the strongest qualities of Zukofsky’s writing, especially as 
it pertains to history. His poetry absorbs everything from his personal life, heritage, culture, 
as well as the literature he read and admired. It is a matter of integration that recalls the 
parameters of “A”-12 describing the desire to incorporate more than just poetry into the 
poetic, the integral of “upper limit music / lower limit speech (“A” 146). 
The history of “A”-23 is one made out of love for the works which inspired his own 
writing. In the poem-essay, “Artifice of Absorption,” Charles Bernstein proposes a quality of 
poetics in their capacity of absorption and impermeability. He writes that “the nature of 
absorption as a dynamic / of reading needs to be understood as a key element / in any 
ideologically conscious literary criticism” (21). However, while I agree with Bernstein in this 
capacity, I would extend his concept of reader to that of the writer, as one who is in the 
practice of reading as well. Zukofsky is perhaps a special example of this dual-role. The 
extent to which other literatures figure into his own writing make “A” as much an illustration 
of a life of engaged reading as it is writing. As fellow Language poet Jed Rasula writes in the 
collection edited by Andrews and Bernstein” “READING IS TRADITIONALLY THE 
MOST NEGLECTED OF ALL ARTS” (52). Zukofsky’s use of literary reference works by 
obscuring and blurring the line between creation and reproduction. Scroggins notes that the 
“poet-horse does not create in the Romantic sense: he ‘sows,’ ‘composes,’ and above all 
‘hunts,’ hoping to find the recurrences in culture out of which to ‘compose’ his own poem” 
(424). It is this diligence of reading that makes the poem one which breathes history in each 
word. 
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The reverence that Zukofsky shows to these literary predecessors has hereto been 
considered through his representation of their writing within his own reconstruction of 
literary history. Through it, we see the founding influences to Zukofsky’s work, particularly 
in Shakespeare, who serves as the “beginning” of that history in “A”-22. But this 
representation of history is only one side of historical embodiment in “A”; Zukofsky should 
be considered simultaneously as reader and writer. The ways in which “A”-23 absorbs and 
integrates the writing of so many other authors, not only through acknowledgement but 
actual citation woven seamlessly with Zukofsky’s own writing, points to Zukofsky as an 
active historical participant, not only the scribe of history. He is engaging with the history as 
much as he is setting it down to paper. It is a creative act of collaborating with the poets from 
long ago, where Zukofsky constructs new poems from old, borrowed words as a means of 
refashioning poetic history and exploding it into the poetic-now. 
Rowe 72 
 
Chapter II 
 
“To answer with the knowledge of history I have”: “A”-21/24 and Historical Interaction 
 
In March of 2018, while formulating my idea for this project I took a trip to New 
York City with classmates of a seminar on 20th Century American Literature, and during a 
break in our schedule, my roommate and I went to see the Guggenheim Museum on 5th 
Avenue. I had gone in hopes of seeing a Picasso or Matisse (I’ve never lived in a place with 
access to such famous works), but it was the central exhibit which ran along the spiral 
walkway that really captured my attention. The work which struck me most was a large 
assemblage, lying on the floor, half copper plating and half scaffolding. We the People 
(2010-2012), a long-term sculptural project by Vietnamese-Danish conceptual artist Danh 
Vō, which appeared as a part of the show Take My Breath Away, consists of a full-scale 
recreation of the Statue of Liberty. However, the sculpture is disassembled, and various 
pieces of the sculpture occupy galleries across the globe. It is an example of conceptual art 
that makes no claims to a traditional form of artistic creation; it is a reproduction in the 
technical sense but does not at all resemble the original in its totality, by virtue of its 
fragmentation. The readings of the project could span from issues of American 
exceptionalism, monoliths of cultural reductionism, or purely aesthetic concerns of 
authorship/creativity, but what I found most engaging and eerie is that We the People is at 
once the Statue of Liberty and not the Statue of Liberty. 
Roberta Smith of The New York Times described Vō, not as an artist, but as a “hunter- 
gatherer,” and while this particular object was “created” in the traditional sense, its source 
image certainly was gathered. It is a fragmented dispersal of the aura of the statue almost 150 
years after its dedication, which begs the observer to reconsider the original and all its 
Rowe 73 
 
promises on its own terms, as time passes. The piece called to mind Viktor Shklovsky’s 
concept of ostranenie (остранение), or “making strange,” through its disrupting such a 
monolithic American icon and giving it back in pieces, to make one ask, ‘What is this? And 
what have I thought it was, all this time?’ Viewing Vō’s piece, I could not help but to think 
of the ways in which the sampling of historical artifacts in writing, as in ekphrastic practices, 
functions in a similar way. Reading Louis Zukofsky at this time – with his employment of a 
myriad of sampled texts – sparked a reconsideration of these artistic monoliths as they are 
reframed centuries later in new contexts. As I have proposed in the previous chapter, 
Zukofsky’s work is preoccupied with reconceptualizing the ways in which older writing 
functions when the contemporary poetic subject incorporates them into a new work. 
This chapter will move away from the subject of historical representation, as 
discussed in Chapter I, and turn to the concept of historical interaction or engagement, and to 
do so I will look at movements 21 and 24 of “A” to survey the methods through which 
Zukofsky applies the philosophy of history from 22/23 in his poetic practice, as performance, 
rather than subject matter, through the engagement of the present individual with historical 
material. This analysis will be grounded in themes of genre, translation, performance and 
plagiarism/originality as they relate to a consideration of Zukofsky’s model for a historically- 
minded poetic consciousness. The theoretical conversation that underlies this discussion is 
informed by Walter Benjamin, again, though in this chapter primarily his essay “The Task of 
the Translator”; Gilles Deleuze on the concept of becoming in writing; and Charles 
Bernstein, through his writings on Zukofsky, as well as his more general writing on poetics 
in Pitch of Poetry. Ultimately, I hope to frame Zukofsky’s project as one which exhibits a 
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kind of escape-work, which resists the isolation of an artwork by producing holes which offer 
lines of flight which reconnect the work to its external reality. 
However, these movements require an augmented kind of reading. Whereas the 
readings in Chapter I were primarily a “traditional” kind of close reading, and although that 
will continue here, a more conceptual framework of reading is necessary to fully draw out the 
complexities and machinations of “A”-21/24. This kind of reading has been inspired by more 
recent poetic developments in the work of Kenneth Goldsmith, Tan Lin, and conceptual 
writing broadly.6 To read these movements “conceptually” is to give emphasis to their 
macro-poetic characteristics, a reading of form, source material, context, etc. I take “A” as an 
opportunity to advance a practice of poetic reading. This is not poetry, strictly speaking, and 
yet as such it seems the most fitting place to address the concerns of a poem’s capacity to 
express and incorporate outside material and manners of writing, as they manifest themselves 
through performances of drama (“A”-21) and music (“A”-24), still within a poem. 
 
 
Zukofsky’s Translations 
 
Before addressing the role of translation in “A” it seems appropriate to consider the 
very important translation of Catullus that Celia and Louis Zukofsky had produced over the 
course of the 1960’s and the contribution that this body of work has made on translation as a 
field. The collaboration was primarily divided between Celia’s actual translating of the Latin 
into English and Louis’ reworking of those translations in order to approximate the sound of 
the original. The brief preface to the collection of translations reads: “This translation of 
Catullus follows the sound, rhythm, and syntax of his Latin – tries, as is said, to breathe the 
 
6 For more on conceptual writing, see Goldsmith’s edited collection, Against Expression: An Anthology of 
Conceptual Writing (2011) 
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‘literal’ meaning with him.” This method is categorized as “homophonic translation,” or 
transliteration for some, wherein semantic meaning is a secondary concern to the 
preservation of the sonic qualities of the original language when translating into the target 
language. 
Debate over precision in translation is an issue with important stakes, especially when 
considering the implications of representation and the colonial status of the source texts. 
Hasty translations geared toward audiences hungry for a taste of the exotic are all too 
common; we need look no further than the disputes around A Thousand and One Nights. But 
one aspect at the heart of this issue is an occupational debate over the tendentious 
relationship between the writer and the translator of the text as two productive entities. 
Narrowing in on this issue in poetry alone, I would like to briefly explore this relationship as 
a kind of preliminary work toward the larger poetic implications of translation based on 
sound. This section will explore the relationship between Walter Benjamin’s essay on “The 
Task of the Translator” (1923) alongside Zukofsky’s practice of homophonic translation, or 
translation based on preservation of the phonetic, and in doing so will hopefully give some 
sense of use-value (to use Deleuze’s metric for literary value) to translations which, at face- 
value, upend the notion of “meaning” (Deleuze’s alternative to use) in source texts in a kind 
of cruel game of distortion. Consulting Paul de Man’s interpretation of Benjamin’s text from 
a 1983 lecture and Charles Bernstein’s essay “Breaking the Translation Curtain: The 
Homophonic Sublime”, I will take as an example Bernstein’s own reading of Louis and Celia 
Zukofsky’s collaborative translation of Catullus as a case study for the potential enabled by 
certain acts of homophonic translation which uphold the concerns of Benjamin, before 
moving on to the implications and full apotheosis of these tendencies in “A”-21. 
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In his reading of Benjamin, Paul de Man takes as a point of departure what he 
identifies as an anti-modern thread in “The Task of the Translator.” Tracing a line from Kant 
and Hegel through philosophy of the 20th century which indicated a movement away from an 
assumed subject, de Man argues that Benjamin’s characterization of writing as ideal, sacred, 
and messianic, without reader in mind, goes against the progression of thought leading up to 
Benjamin’s own time (de Man 17). This mystic quality to writing, its potential, de Man 
ascertains, leaves Benjamin in a place between “nihilistic rigor and sacred revelation,” where 
in spite of the seriousness of his critique there maintains the optimism for a redemption of 
“pure language” (de Man18). And it is this simultaneous allowance for critical awareness and 
a belief that newness can be made that allows for us to apply his theories of translation to 
specific enacted modes of translating which strive to realize this pure language. This is a 
useful point of delineation for this essay, in that by isolating Benjamin’s concern for writing 
as an optimistic endeavor we might take this hopefulness as our primary concern with respect 
to what may be gained through the process of translation. According to Benjamin, “all 
suprahistorical kinship of languages rests in the intention underlying each language as a 
whole – an intention, however, which no single language can attain by itself but which is 
realized only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each other: pure language” 
(78). This idealistic, pure language is not something to be clarified or problematized here, but 
instead I wish to consider only one process through which this “totality” may be realized, 
being that of homophonic translation. 
As another aspect to this issue, there is also the construction of difference between 
poet and translator, a distinction articulated by Benjamin: “as translation is a mode of its 
own, the task of the translator, too, may be regarded as distinct and clearly differentiated 
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from the task of the poet” that task which “consists in finding that intended effect [Intention] 
upon the language into which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the original” 
(79). The task is indeed refracted, though perhaps not “distinct,” for there is a case to be 
made for the poetic qualities that arise and filter through the process of translation, especially 
for a poet like Zukofsky. It seems naïve to deny that the influence translators possess over the 
poem inevitably affects the production of “poetic” sensations that were absent in the original, 
although, to Benjamin’s credit, it is true this does not necessarily make the translator a poet. 
But for Charles Bernstein, this hard line between the poet and translator is not so 
impermeable. He argues in Attack of the Difficult Poems that, 
Disputes about translation are always a pretext for disputes about poetry. Translation 
theory is poetics by another name… attacks on translation for ‘unfaithfulness’ are 
typically pretexts for a rejection of a style of poetry in the translator’s own language 
that the attacker finds unacceptable, unfaithful to his or her sense of the properties of 
that language. (201) 
 
Bernstein’s assertion, that within translation theory is always poetic theory, is useful in 
considering the distinction between translation as a purely extra-literary act or as a poetic 
collaboration. The latter, in explicit terms, perhaps relies on practices engendered by more 
recent artistic techniques of intentional plagiarism, pastiche and remix. If we grant Bernstein 
preference over Benjamin in the defined difference between poet and translator, we can 
actually further grasp the translator’s responsibility to make something new out of their own 
language, navigating the issue of fidelity, “for what can be accurately paraphrased is not the 
‘poetic’ content of the work” (Bernstein 199). Here is not the place to dispute notions of what 
makes “poetic content,” but it is useful to consider that poetry is not defined by its referential, 
signified content. Instead, it must be viewed as a whole of parts incorporating these various 
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aspects: content, sound, form, etc.: a network of poetic affects in which translation only 
occupies one node. 
What, then, is a model of translation that can accommodate the tenants laid down by 
Benjamin? Perhaps (part of) the answer lies in the practice of homophonic translation. On 
more than one occasion, Benjamin, perhaps unwittingly, invokes the aspect of sound in 
language, writing that the “basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which 
his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected  
by the foreign tongue” (82). This invocation of the “tongue,” which typically stands in for 
“language,” also points to the physicality of the language as it is expressed orally, thus 
emphasizing the role that the aural language plays in translation. This is typically at odds 
with semantic meaning when moving between certain languages, and therefore sound is often 
set aside in poetic translations. However, if we take literally this call to let the language be 
“powerfully affected by the foreign tongue” then it makes sense to consider how the original 
language, when sound is maintained, sounds in the target language. 
Bernstein claims that “Letting the sound lead is crucial, or often crucial, for the sound 
may lead to the sense” (200). Instead of striving for sense from the isolated translation of 
meaning word-by-word, we may let the sound show the way in order to test Benjamin’s 
proposition for the translator to “release in his own language that pure language which is 
under the spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of 
that work” (82). This is a radical re envisioning of “re-creation” at a sonic level where we 
must set aside (at least temporarily) the compulsion to adhere to literal meaning and consider 
a poem as something more complex than line-regulated writing. Perhaps then, homophonic 
translation serves as a new horizon for poetic translation. It is the mode in which the sound, 
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the syntax is preserved from the original, but the translator must make a poem out of their 
own language in order to give something to the original. They have given due representation 
to the original and breathed life of a new language into it, stretching the significance of the 
original even at its moment of conception and pushing the limits of the target language to 
incorporate the sound and structures of poetic syntax from outside of it. 
At this point it makes sense to turn to an example of such translation, in order to see 
how it works and makes use of its source. As an illustration of the Zukofskys’ translations I’d 
like to triangulate the distinction of their work, taking Catullus’s poem numbered 85 as an 
example. The original Latin reads “Odi et amo. quare id faciam, fortasse requires. / nescio, 
sed fieri sentio et excrucior.” In his 2013 collection of poetry, Recalculating, Charles 
Bernstein translates “85” as “Hate and love. Why’s what?, you’d ask / Don’t know, I feel it 
and it’s torture.” (136). Then, in the Zukofskys’ translation, “85” is rendered as, “O th’hate I 
move love. Quarry it fact I am, for that’s so re queries. / Nescience, say th’ fiery scent I owe 
whets crookeder” (Complete Short Poetry 310). 
As we can see in this comparison, the general effect of the Zukofskys’ translation, 
content-wise, is not much different from Bernstein’s; hate and love are present, questions, not 
knowing, and then pain. But the Zukofskys have managed to convey a similar semantic 
message while preserving the music of the original; for instance, note the sonic promiximity 
between “quare id faciam” and “Quarry it fact I am,” which produces a peculiar English that 
is somehow able to preserve “literal” meaning while at the same time translating the sound 
into a different language. Ezra Pound had attempted such a task in translating Catullus and 
found it impossible, choosing to translate his work into prose. Here I provide another 
example, first the original and then the translation, 
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Original English Translation 
Furi, villula vestra non ad Austriflatus 
opposita est neque ad Favoni 
nec saevi Boreae aut Apheliotae 
verum ad milia quindecim et ducentos. 
O ventum horribilem atque pestilentem! 
Furious, “Little Villa” has no not for Auster, 
Flaw to oppose a taste naked to Favonius, 
Nor sighs with Boreas, out Apheliotes. 
Worms eats and mill it fifteen thousand two hundred 
O vent them horrible, I’m out quite, pestilent mm. 
(Complete Short Poetry p. 257) 
 
 
A first glance might produce the recognition of the use of cognates in translation, which 
gestures toward common grounds of intention across language, such as “Furi” to “Furious”. 
But what is more interesting is the departure from the original, “intended meaning” in pursuit 
of the phonic preservation, as shown in the final line of Zukofsky’s translation. The 
movement from “pestilentem” to “pestilent mm” is a point of breakdown, where we find the 
limit of the capacity for English to incorporate and sponsor the Latin. While some methods of 
translation, what Benjamin refers to as the “fidelity” to the text,” would seek to correct this in 
a way that would make sense to the reader of the translated text, Zukofsky uses it to put forth 
the “failure” of translation, for if the text is automatically to fail, then why obscure this 
through falsity? The effect of this breakdown is similar to the paratactic qualities of the 
writing in “A”-22/23, where the drastic juxtaposition of disparate poetic phrases produced a 
continuous, jarring effect which short circuits at each moment of disjunction. Zukofsky’s 
translation is thus one that brings to the forefront the breakdown between languages, to show 
limits. The translation does not make much “sense,” but its non-sense speaks to a relationship 
between languages that gives understanding to both, as acts of language instead of discrete 
deployments of language in poetry: it is an illustration of the space between languages, rather 
than of one language or the other. 
This form of translation, then, may be less appealing to a reading public than for the 
translator or philosopher of language, like an experiment. The results show that, alas, there 
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are breakdowns between the two languages, and that this may be a more significant finding 
than whatever was to be gleaned from finally reading Catullus in a language one can 
understand. It speaks not only to the limitations of translation but to the limitations in the 
language Catullus had at his own disposal. 
The themes and examples of translation discussed thus far are, admittedly, narrow in 
the scope of translation studies. I have not taken up the more wordly aspects of translation, 
whose importance extends far beyond the notion of homophonic translation or the 
consideration of the translator as an artistic force. Not all texts support an ethical application 
of such a translation, as it puts forth the translator over the original author, and this is the last 
thing needed in the kind of translation ethics advocated by Gayatri Spivak. We might 
consider homophonic translation as a useful exercise in the Benjaminian pursuit “purer” 
relationship between poetics and language, where a reevaluation of the poetic tensions 
between English and French may be explored in a “new” translation of Mallarmé, as an 
example. There is a time and place for asserting the politics of translation, and those devoted 
to aesthetics divorced from the real world are not the ones to take up representation for the 
realities of other languages or worlds, but perhaps homophonic translation might serve to 
speak to a poetics of translation, where that relationship between languages, the failures that 
occur in the in between, are placed front and center as an independent point of inquiry. 
 
 
“A”-21 
 
“A”-21 is a translation of the play Rudens by the Roman playwright Plautus (c.254 
BC-184 BC). Zukofsky began the poem in mid-august 1966, finishing in only six months, 
which was a significantly shorter effort than the production of the Catullus translations 
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(Scroggins 398). Zukofsky found striking similarities between Rudens and Shakespeare’s 
Pericles, Prince of Tyre, and believed that Shakespeare had taken inspiration from Plautus in 
this work, an opinion Scroggins identifies as “a minority, if not lone, opinion” (399). The 
play is dedicated in part to, his brother Morris Ephraim, who had died shortly after Zukofsky 
commenced work on “A”-21, but whom Zukofsky credited as being the one to introduce him 
to poetry and the theater. 
A comedy written in the late 2nd century BC, the play tells the story of Palaestra who, 
after being kidnapped by pirates as a child, is serendipitously reunited with her father 
Daemones, through his encounter with her pimp, Labrax. Rudens is a complicated story due 
to its comedic qualities, which obscure the clarity of the story and the resolution of its events, 
particularly in the pleasure Daemones takes in listening to the arguments over the propriety 
of Palaestra and the trunk containing proof of her identity. The trunk is discovered by the 
slave-fisherman Gripus, Daemones’ slave, who pulls it up by the rope (of the title of the play) 
and is what eventually leads her to be reunited with Daemones and her mother, Daedalis. 
Marc Scroggins identifies the play as a homophonic translation, but this is not entirely 
the case. Zukofsky’s translation follows the story of Rudens but in the form of five-word 
lines. The immediate effect of this method, when compared to many English translations, is 
the speed of the story, as the reduced number of words expressing the same amount of plot 
produces a quickened pace. On the strangeness of the text, Scroggins writes, 
Not merely is the sound of the verse alien, but the syntax, compressed to an absolute 
minimum, begins to fragment. At times the language seems to explore the furthest 
reaches of late-1960s countercultural hipness; at others, it seems almost unbearably 
oblique and hard to follow—an odd effect, particularly in a movement of his poem 
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that seems particularly concerned with the values of the drama, an inherently public 
art (Poetry of Knowledge 38) 
With respect to movements “A”-22/23, “A”-21 and the final movement, “A”-24, occupy 
radically different generic forms. While 22/23 may be considered more traditional in the 
sense of their recognizability as poetry – line breaks, etc. - the inclusion of a full seventy- 
page dramatic piece within the larger framework of a poem is experimental to say the least. 
However, this is not to say that “A”-21 is without poetic features. In fact, it follows rather 
closely the prosody of “A”-22/23 in terms of form, as Zukofsky uses the same five-word line 
structure that he continually turns to and perfects throughout his later poetic career. 
Similar to the translations of Catullus, we can see the preservation of sound in 
 
Zukofsky’s translation of the first line: “pro di immortals, tempestem quoius modi” (Plautus 
 
412) translated to “Prodigal immortals what a tempest” (“A” 442). The combination of 
producing a line-for-line translation and maintaining the phonetic qualities as much as 
possible render “A”-21 into a cribbed version of the original in which the contents of the play 
are blown through. The ambiguity that this produces has an effect that is somewhat 
antithetical to the inherently public nature of theatre. The inclusion of the play within a poem 
makes sense with respect to the cryptic qualities of the other movements of “A”, but 
paradoxically it makes very little sense as a theatrical work, which Scroggins dubs “an 
assault on the audience.” 
Zukofsky translates even the names of the characters. On the first page of the 
movements, there are two columns, “Personae” on the left and “Characters” on the right. In 
the left column are the names of the characters as they appear in the original, and on the right 
are Zukofsky’s alterations of those names. Not all of the names are changed but some are: 
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Sceparnio Servus becomes “Scape”; Palaestra becomes “Polly”; Gripus Piscator becomes 
“Greave”; “Daemones Senex” becomes “Dads” (“A” 438). These emendations bring the 
proper nouns of the Latin into the 20th century, particularly in Polly and Dads’ names, and 
this also occurs in the translation of Plautus’ original into more colloquial English. By setting 
up the Personae next to Characters, Zukofsky diagrams the movement of translation in a way 
that is typically on available in bilingual editions, bringing the textuality of the original into 
the present. 
An interesting point of departure for reading “A”-21 is a significant formal distinction 
between it and the original, in the inclusion of the sections marked “(Voice[s] off),” which 
are not present at all in the Latin. As a translation it seems fitting to pay close attention to 
moments of difference, where Zukofsky is drastically playing with both the content of the 
original, and with the form of the theatre The first of these reads, 
nine 
men’s 
morris 
 
this 
is 
my 
Form 
 
a 
voice 
blown (“A” 445) 
 
In this instance, the original moves directly from one speaker (Scape) to the other (Polly), 
without the off-stage interjection. But this passage serves as an excellent capsule for broader 
themes in the play: revision of the historical, updating, and the interjection of the personal 
into the work itself, as “morris” may represent Zukofsky’s brother mentioned in the 
dedication to the movement, as well as a reference to Titania’s speech in Act II, Scene I of A 
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Midsummer Night’s Dream. The characterization of the voice as “blown” evokes the timbre 
of the horn in a musical sense, correlating the human voice and, by extension, poetry with the 
musical instrument, a theme which is present from the very first page of “A” in the 
invocation of Bach’s Passion of St. Matthew. This takes the quality of performance inherent 
to drama and multiplies it, making it also a musical affair by adding a further performative 
and generic element. With the above-mentioned obscurity of its breakneck language and the 
addition of original material, Zukofsky is creating a rowdy spectacle of the performance of 
Rudens which simultaneously contracts language and blows up the performative aspect. It is 
in this sense that we may understand “A”-21 not only as a translation of Rudens but as a 
staged performance or adaptation of it, but one that is somewhat self-negating: the public art 
that is almost impossible to follow; the translation that is really producing its own new 
material, and in the context of the translator’s own poem. 
Bob Perelman addresses these paradoxical and self-negating qualities in “A”-21 as 
well. Of the lines “a / voice / blown,” Perelman writes that “in Elizabethan usage ‘blown’ 
would designate a voice that has flowered to perfection; as contemporary slang it implies 
fatigue or failure” (213). This appeal to contradictory etymologies is a characteristically 
Zukofskian move, where the history of a word is employed to both multiply and obscure its 
meaning in the poem. The middle lines, “this / is / my / form,” constitute a similarly 
contradictory claim considering its position within a translated work, though, at the same 
time of course, in a section of a translated work that does not occur in the original. Perhaps it 
is a claim on homophonic translation or the five-word line; Perelman adds to this list 
“Shakespeare’s writing and the organic folk dance presumably behind it, the ambiguously 
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blown voice, and the whole project of translating Plautus, identifying with Plautus, and 
producing writing that is in social terms utterly distant from Plautus” (213). 
In the same way that Benjamin calls for translator’s to allow the source language to 
have a pronounced effect on the tongue of the target language, Zukofsky’s translation of 
Rudens uses the form of the play bring together two languages as they are sounded out at 
once. David Wray refers to Zukofsky’s translation as “a language one knows, but knows only 
as ‘foreign’ and so must construe, actively, tentatively, with all the receptivity and respect of 
heightened awareness: an American English that asks to be read as if it were Latin” (60, my 
emphasis). And while I agree with Wray’s determination that “A”-21 is an 
“acknowledgement of relation” (99), Zukofsky always takes it as his point to incorporate as 
much historical material as he can, so that it is never simply a line drawn between only two 
historical moments. In another of these voice-off sections, a peculiar archaic quality creeps 
in. However, this quality is not archaic in the classical Latin sense, but in the medieval 
English sense, as the off-stage voices sound “great / ones eat up little ones: / that gives 
heauen countlesse / Eyes to view mens actes. (457). The first alarming feature is the shift to a 
spelling of Renaissance-era English. It is evident in this passage that something funny is 
happening temporally, with archaic English spelling occurring in a Latin translation that is 
for the most part a kind of colloquial American English. Furthermore, the italicized sections 
are, in fact, quotations. Here, in the translation of the Roman play is a citation from Act I, 
Scene I of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, spoken by Pericles. The evocation of archaic 
English in this passage has the effect of homogenizing that tongue with the past of Plautus: 
one old world, with the poet looking back and adding the intermediary Shakespeare to the 
heap of literary history. Zukofsky’s translation acts like Dante moving through the Inferno 
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and all of its inhabitants, from different times, living together at once. Again, this is a matter 
of integration, where Zukofsky, through translation, makes more whole the writing of the 
past as they are considered in the eyes of one contemporary poet. 
Even the plot of the play itself speaks to this tendency toward integration, as it centers 
around bring Polly back to her family. During the scene in which she becomes shipwrecked, 
while only briefly before reuniting with her friend, she cries out, 
I will never know here. 
Show me the way out 
Someone, show me a narrow 
Path – here or there riddles, 
Nothing here grows I see. 
(“A” 446) 
 
 
Polly’s plea for release from this isolation is underscored by the comedic irony of the 
situation, that throughout the play she is, in fact, with her father, or at least nearby. But 
because “nothing here grows” indicates that the space is hermetically sealed off points to the 
need to escape in order to reconnect, so that growth of sight and self may occur. It is a call to 
reach back out, rhizomatically, and create connections that have been severed. Furthermore, 
the first line’s connection between knowing and place, “I will never know here,” speaks to a 
placelessness that is affected by the disconnection. The “here” is meaningless without 
external contrast – she doesn’t even know where “here” is – and the same may be said for 
writing, especially when recalling Deleuze and Guattari’s criticism of the Total Book that 
seeks to cut itself off from everything else. Zukofsky’s practice of translation, however, 
reconnects these disparate, isolated elements across time, which can be seen even in the 
play’s title. 
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Rudens translates as “The Rope”, and the place of the rope in the complicated plot 
should be mentioned, as well as its relationship with Zukofsky’s poem. The rope used by the 
fisherman Greaves to pull up the trunk containing Polly’s belongings, and thereby saving her, 
is an example of a device which ties an otherwise disparate chaos together. For Zukofsky, the 
rope serves as an important metaphor for the themes of time and history that are presented 
throughout “A” and have been surveyed throughout the last chapter of this project. Wray 
identifies the rope as a “synechdochic metaphor of [the play’s] fortuitously concatenated 
sequence of events” (60). The significant line “no key to the tangle,” from which I derived 
the title to my project, mirrors the rope as necessarily knotted; to pull at the line would 
unravel the whole, and the tension of the rope, which keeps in order the connection between 
past/future, here/there, I/eye, would come undone. 
“A”-24 
 
Ronald Johnson, an American-born poet coming of age in the wake of the Black 
Mountain school of poets, recognized the significant influence of Zukofsky in the 
“Afterword” to his own life-poem ARK (composed between 1970 and 1990, and first 
collected in 2013). However, Johnson sets his own aims in ARK apart from what he sees as 
the common thread between Zukofsky, Pound, and Charles Olson in their conception and 
inclusion of history in poetry. Johnson writes, “If my confreres wanted to write a work with 
all of history in its maw, I wished, from the beginning, to start all over again, attempting to 
know nothing but the will to create, and matter at hand” (Johnson 311). As a side note, I 
would argue that Johnson’s work in fact displays a very conservative take on the epic 
tradition, and is more guilty of denying his debt to history than actually starting over. I would 
perhaps agree with Johnson’s desire to part from the methods of Pound (who starts with 
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Homer’s Odyssey in translation), or Olson (whose Maximus Poems begins with a strong 
assertion of epic-hero Will), or even Williams’ Paterson, which starts with a beginning as 
well and concerns itself, like Olson’s, with the history of a place. But I would argue that 
Johnson has misconstrued the concept of history as Zukofsky has set out to deal with it. 
Pound’s desire to write the “poem including history” is not the same for Zukofsky. “A” does 
not try to contain or circumscribe history within the sphere of the individual poet; history is 
not at its center and Zukofsky knows better than anyone that history cannot be contained. 
What Zukofsky does in his writing is, if we continue the model of circumscription, put his 
poem at the center, and break the circle apart, so that the poem may begin to reach back out 
and connect itself to the events, persons, artistic creation, sounds, and troubles of history, and 
no piece of Zukofsky’s entire oeuvre exemplifies this more than the final and 24th movement 
of “A”, wherein all these disparate elements are proven to be not that disparate at all. 
Beginning work in December of 1966, “A”-24 was arranged by Celia Zukofsky and 
given to her husband as a gift in March of 1968 (Scroggins 411-12). Originally entitled “L.Z. 
Masque,” and only later chosen as the most fitting ending to his lifelong work, “A”-24 is a 
setting of various pieces of Zukofsky’s writing to the harpsicord pieces by German composer 
George Frideric Handel. The written pieces Celia drew from span every genre Zukofsky had 
worked in, and are divided by genre into the four voices of the masque (with Handel’s pieces 
serving as the fifth “voice”): “Story,” from the collection of fiction It Was (1959); 
“Thought,” from the collection of essays, Prepositions (1968); “Drama”: from the play Arise, 
Arise (1962); and “Poetry,” all of which is drawn from earlier sections of “A”.7 
 
 
7 At this point I would like to briefly clarify a formal issue in writing about “A”-24. As the entire movement is 
set to musical notation, with the four voices occurring simultaneously, there is no numbering of lines. Thus, in 
referring to sections of the movement I will specify the page on which the line occurred, as well as the initial for 
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The question of authorship in “A”-24 is an interesting one. The music is accredited to 
Handel, though on the recommendation of the Zukofskys’ son, Paul. All of the words were 
written by Louis, though we know by now that even “his” words often belong to others. And 
“A”-24, as a whole, was fashioned together by Celia. Whereas in “A”-21 the historical 
engagement occurred between Zukofsky and Plautus, “A”-24 is a much more collaborative 
and multifaceted project. In many ways it is an engagement between Zukofsky and himself, 
for, although it is Celia who really produced the masque, the inclusion of “A”-24 as the last 
movement of “A” shows Zukofsky rehashing his own work in the same exact way he has 
done with Bach, Shakespeare, Spinoza, Marx, Chaucer, Adams, etc. throughout the entire 
poem. 
The combination of the five different generic voices takes what “A”-21 performs – a 
drama in the middle of a poem – and condenses it to a single movement set to another 
performative genre: five voices occurring simultaneously in a musical setting. This echoes 
the claim made in “A”-12 over 20 years before, a fulfillment of his own poetic manifesto, 
when Zukofsky wrote, 
I’ll tell you. 
About my poetics – 
 
music 
∫ 
speech 
 
An integral 
Lower limit speech 
Upper limit music 
(“A” 138) 
 
 
the voice to which I refer: (S)tory, (T)hought, (D)rama, (P)oetry. For instance, in referring to a line of drama on 
page 725, I will cite: (“A” 725, D). 
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“A”-24 immediately poses a problem of reading. How is one to go about reading four 
concurrent lines of writing at the same time? Even more, how does one do this to music? In 
Celia’s prefatory note to the masque, she specifies that “The words are NEVER SUNG to the 
music” (“A” 564). The creates a tension from the start between music and speech, or rather it 
sets the lower and upper limits of the piece: four genres of writing, occurring simultaneously, 
set to music, never sung. However, there is a further note that the dynamics of the voices 
should be dictated by the size of the font (from 10pt-12pt). In turn, there is a dynamics of 
speech in this performance, though it must never become a voice that is singing. This 
highlights, once again, the role of limits and liminalities in Zukofsky’s writing; the voice is 
like an asymptote that is to constantly approach the threshold of becoming-music but never 
arrives. As an illustration of this counterpoint I’ve done my best to approximate the spacing 
of measures 26-29 of Act I, Scene I, 
 
 
T: Homer: to “tune in” 
D: Steak – steak – steak – 
(sings the words to the notes of do, re, mi) 
S: to some more  than myself 
P: harmony -- / That 
 
 
Note that “Homer” and “harmony” are to occur on the same beat, sharing the sound of the 
“h” but then moving apart after that. Yet, the next words of the Thought line indicate they are 
tuning in, when they are not be sung at all, and have in fact tuned out. The repetition of the 
word “steak,” which seems to recall the “Food” section of Gertrude Stein’s Tender Buttons, 
is directed in the play to be sung along the major scale, but Celia specified that it is never to 
be sung. What is a performer to do, or a reader to think? The juxtaposition of the fragmented 
“to some more than myself” with “harmony” is the kind of multivocal poetic that is perhaps 
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only possible when one constructs a framework like this. Individually, these lines remain 
difficult to analyze, for what is typically contained in a single paragraph or verse is stretched 
out across pages of music, which also challenges the attention span of readers. It turns the 
poetic value of the lines inside out, as they only begin to open up when considered alongside 
each other. The opening of each voice in Act I, scene I, “Cousin: Lesson” shows that what is 
being entered is a realm of sound, 
And it is possible in imagination to divorce speech of all graphic elements, to let it 
become a movement of sounds. (566, T) 
This story was a story of our time. And a writer’s attempts not to fathom his time 
 
amount but to sounding is mind in it. (566, S) 
 
Blest / Infinite things / So many / Which confuse imagination / Thru its weakness, / 
To the ear / Noises. (566-67, P) 
In many ways, “A”-24 becomes an exercise in reading; reading slowly, deliberately so that 
we may hear the ways in which the voices interact. Peter Quartermain refers to “A”-24 as the 
exemplary illustration of what he calls Zukofsky’s “instant entirety” (65). This is the whole 
career of an artist happening at once. The effect of moving through “A”-24 is like 
experiencing the life of Zukofsky in the very same way that Zukofsky curates the rest of 
history in “A”-22/23: not all of it is there, but the work that lingers remains piled up in its 
afterlife. This echoes Benjamin’s writing of on the afterlives of works in translation, where 
“A”-24 functions as the “translation” of his life’s writing into music, marking “the stage of 
continued life” (Benjamin 255). This is the proper rendering of life, exercised in the poem of 
a life. Benjamin writes of the responsibility of this rendering that 
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The concept of life is given its due only if everything that has a history of its own, 
and is not merely the setting for history, is credited with life. In the final analysis, the 
range of life must be determined by the standpoint of history rather than that of 
nature, least of all by such tenuous factors as sensation and soul. The philosopher's 
task consists in comprehending all of natural life through the more encompassing life 
of history. 
Benjamin, “Task of the Translator,” 255 
This notion of the dynamic between life and history is not so different from what Zukofsky 
claims in his essay “An Objective”: “The lens bringing the rays from an object to a focus. 
That which is aimed at. (Use extended to poetry)—Desire for what is objectively perfect, 
inextricably the direction of historic and contemporary particulars” (Prepositions+ 12). It is 
the expression of the responsibility to give due diligence in poetic (or general) representation 
and thought. This is perhaps the defining quality of Zukofsky’s poetry, one that remains 
relevant even through the prolific development and broad scope of his writing. This is not the 
epiphanic poetry of the Romantics or even someone like Pound; it is about grappling with 
things as they exist within their own complicated web of history and interaction. 
I am not typically keen on relying on statements by the author, and especially 
Zukofsky because in his lectures and interviews he always seemed so reticent to explain to 
others the work he saw as obvious in its aims, but at this point I’d like to address the 
foreword written for “A”, which encapsulates this concern for unity and recurrence: 
not to fathom time but literally to sound it as on an instrument and so to hear again 
as much of what was and is together, as one breathes without pointing to it before 
and after. The story must exist in each word or it cannot go on. The words written 
down – or even inferred as written over, crossed out – must live, not seem merely to 
glance at a watch. 
Zukofsky, Prepositions+, 228 (his italics) 
Rowe 94 
 
 
Zukofsky wrote this in 1967, several years before completing “A” and, interestingly enough, 
before Celia completed and gifted to him the “L.Z. Masque.” The feeling of simultaneity in 
his poetry is captured by his idea that the “story must exist in each word or it cannot go on,” 
where the whole must be present in each part, like fractals, and “A”-24 is that representation 
of “what was and is together.” Zukofsky is describing poetic consciousness as a kind of 
whirlpool, where the neat divisions of period, genre, school, etc., are less relevant precisely 
because they function as categorical divisions. 
The final bit of verse in “A” occurs at the end of the index specific to “A”-24, before 
the full index begins. It reads, 
 
 
the gift— 
she hears 
the work 
in its recurrence 
 
L.Z. 
 
Here Zukofsky acknowledges, first of all, Celia as the real creator of this text as it is. He also 
considers it a product of hearing, not reading, that the work exists only because it came into 
contact with someone else. It could not have become “A”-24 without it reaching out to 
another set of eyes and ears and hands to make something new entirely out of things ready- 
made. But most importantly, Zukofsky addresses the work recurrence. “A” has taken as its 
main concern folding the historical – be that events or writing – into his own creative 
process, so that the poetic subject he illustrates is one intensely aware of himself, too, as a 
historical subject. 
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My concern in the previous chapter was Zukofsky’s attempt to bring together 
disparate historical events, persons, and materials into a new poetic assemblage that 
embraced what Benjamin would call now-time, turning away from historical plot-based story 
toward a disjointed heap of history that could serve as a model for new poetic possibilities. 
“A”-22/23 are a process of integration, the metaphor so aptly applied by Zukofsky himself. 
“A”-21, even, is the embodiment of that integration, though it is enacted, not told; rather than 
taking history as a subject matter through which to advance new poetic methods, “A”-21 
takes literary history, and performs it through a highly idiosyncratic translation that manages 
to integrate Plautus, Shakespeare, the five-word line, Zukofsky’s personal life, and the rest of 
“A” all at once. Again, “A”-24 is the full illustration of integration, in a formal sense, 
through its incorporation of such disparate genres of writing; it is the microcosm and 
realization of the major thrusts of “A”. 
However, this characteristic of unification and incorporation is one that occurs on the 
level of its poetic construction, and for the rest of this chapter I will turn to what I consider to 
be the real value of “A”24: its dissemination and destruction. For if “A”-24 is able to show 
an immense capacity for integrating differing elements, it is equally, and perhaps even more 
profoundly, capable of disintegrating. I would like to propose a theoretical concept to explain 
this capacity for disintegration: escape-work. 
 
 
Escape-work 
 
A few clarifications are in order. First of all, my use of the term escape-work does not 
signify “work” in the nominal sense, but in the verbal sense. This is, in part, a response to 
Roland Barthes’ essay “From Work to Text,” which I will address shortly. The goal here is 
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to, in the spirit of the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, see how the text works when 
it is performed through its circulation. My reading of “A”-24 was a catalyzing experience in 
what I saw as a need for a framework to think about writing that seemed to, at least try to, 
transcend the limitations of itself as writing. Instead of remaining closed off to the outside, 
escape-work encompasses the formal or conceptual method(s) through which a work of art 
dodges, dissolves, subverts, recodes, and disappears from its own discursive mode. Escape- 
work affects the machinations of the work of art that reach out and seek to reconnect with the 
external. An acknowledgement of the etymology of “escape” will show the physical nature of 
its definition, as a combination of the Latin roots ex, meaning “out,” and cappa, signaling 
“cloak,” the word may be understood as “going away while hidden.” 
I would consider escape-work to be relevant to works of art that resist linearity; 
incorporate features which gesture outside of the text, create holes in it; are maintained 
within a dominant genre (novel, western film, portrait painting, etc.); exhaust their own 
generic or thematic limitations. Additionally, these works may utilize other artistic modes to 
open texts to the outside and gesture to the limitations of their own genres, as well as their 
affinities with others. 
In his lecture on “Multiplicity,” collected in Six Memos for the Next Millennium, Italo 
Calvino addresses the state of encyclopedism in the modern novel. And while his concerns 
rest mainly in the novel, along with his reliance on Ovid and Lucretius, I believe that his 
ideas apply equally to the modern long poem, and in particular a poem like “A”. Calvino 
says that “The world expands until it becomes ungraspable, and for Proust it is through the 
suffering of this ungraspability that we come to knowledge” (Calvino 136). “A” is just a 
work that brings to the notion of the ungraspable to the forefront, with its encyclopedic 
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tendencies, as a discuss at the end of Chapter I, showing at least one way through which we 
seek to cope with an overwhelming amount of knowledge. He goes on, 
what if it were possible for a work to be conceived beyond the self, a work that 
allowed us to escape the limited perspective of the individual ego, not only to ender 
other similar selves but to give voice to that which cannot speak – the bird on the 
gutter, the tree in spring and the tree in autumn, stone, cement, plastic… 
Calvino, 152 
 
Calvino’s evocation of an “escape” has led me, in part, to propose this concept for reading 
tendencies of a work, like “A”, which seeks to move passed conceptual limitations in order 
to release the voices, affects, and connections that are stilted by such limitations. This is the 
dissolving of boundaries, attempted or fulfilled, that are the aim of escape-work. 
In order to foreground some of theoretical influence to my use of this term, I would 
like to briefly address Barthes’ “From Work to Text.” His essay functions as a proposition 
for a new category of literary (and by extension cultural) production and accorded methods 
of reading the movement from, as the title indicates, a work to a text, defined by Barthes 
(obliquely) through a series of comparisons on concepts such as plurality, computability, 
filiation, etc. The impetus for this distinction, Barthes argues, stems from the rise of 
Marxism, anthropology, Freudianism, and semiotics, all of which he credits with “a certain 
change [that] has taken place (or is taking place) in our conception of language and, 
consequently, of the literary work” of that language, giving way to a new category, “Text,” to 
overturn the former category, “work” (1277). In short, what Barthes is advocating is a new 
system of considering the text as a phenomenon with respect to the language in which it was 
written, which primarily means a turn towards less deterministic modes of reading, modes of 
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reading that double as acts of writing the Text at hand, so readers should “try to abolish (or at 
the very least diminish) the distance between writing and reading, in no way by intensifying 
the projection of the reader into the work but by joining them in a single signifying practice” 
(Barthes 1281). However, this also signals the textualization of the reader. 
As a main component in the relinquishing of the text to the reader, though not totally, 
Barthes denies the paternal filial connection associated with critics like Harold Bloom and 
his concept of “anxiety” and treats the author simply as a character of the text. This can be a 
productive model of reading which levels author with text, but in certain cases, which will be 
addressed, this is a dangerous practice to adopt. In this sense, it seems that Barthes, in 
preserving the possibilities for play in the reading/writing act, must sever certain concrete 
connections with the text in order to maintain the possibility of a holistic intertextuality. One 
instance of this is Barthes’ distinction between the work as object and the Text as 
“methodological field,” where “the work can be held in hand, the Text is held in language” as 
writing that flees, as language often does (Barthes 1278). This “methodological field,” and 
the most extreme expansion of it, is the realm of escape-work. 
I can think of no better model for this than “A”-24. As I have addressed above, a 
distinguishing feature of the movement is that no “new” work was composed for it, for it is 
entirely composed of earlier writings, yet the movement itself stands as the new work. That it 
represents an original work in spite of these peculiarities is part of what makes “A”-24 a 
fitting example of escape-work. Because the writing is still all Zukofsky’s own, it does not 
attempt to erase the author; if anything, the author is anthologized within his own work. 
However, this does not render the poem a closed system, because it is still fundamentally 
collaborative. The selections were not made by the author, but by the collator, and as a 
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musical setting, Handel, too, becomes another “collaborator.” All of these aspects make “A”- 
24 a challenge in artistic taxonomy: Is it a poem? A song? A work of visual art? The 
questions elicited by the work insure that it will remain open to the outside – its 
intertextuality, to other texts by Zukofsky and other authors altogether, to the poet’s life and 
the reality of the poem’s composition; its problematizing of concrete artistic genres and their 
classification – all these uncertainties, while still symptomatic of a “difficult” poem, 
nevertheless make it a poem of this world, as it does not seek to separate itself and, in fact, 
seems only ever to strive towards incorporating more and more of the world around it. 
In “Literature as Life,” Deleuze asserts that “[w]riting is a question of becoming, 
always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any 
livable or lived experienced,” and should be a social field of engagement which “begins only 
when a third person is born in us that strips us of the power to say ‘I’” (Deleuze 1-3). This is 
a very different formulation than the one implied in A Thousand Plateaus; it is not a denial of 
the “I,” but the multiplying of the self from within so that the self is not erased but connected 
to another intrinsically, which in the case of “A”-24 means connecting to others as much as 
multiplying the self and connecting to those new selves. In the most pronounced celebration 
of language’s potential, Deleuze writes, 
As Proust says, [literature] opens up a kind of foreign language within language, 
which is neither another language nor a rediscovered patois, but a becoming-other of 
language, a minorization of this language, a delirium that carries it off, a witch’s line 
that escapes the dominant system… They are not interruptions of the process, but 
breaks that form part of it, like an eternity that can only be revealed in a becoming, or 
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a landscape that only appears in movement. They are not outside language, but the 
outside of language (5) 
This concept of an “outside of language” echoes the integral established by Zukofsky in “A”- 
12 of “upper limit music / lower limit speech,” for the approach of the limit (which is not 
reached) is precisely the model of becoming. “A”-24 is building that “social field of 
engagement” which is not a product of some singular creative genius but a poet willing to 
acknowledge other writing, and give to new life to it, by breathing with it in his own work. 
Deleuze’s idea that powerful writing engages in a process of “becoming-other” than writing 
has led me to this conclusion that Zukofsky’s writing is ripping apart the limitation of the 
book that restrict its ability to move outside of itself, to enter the world that excludes it as a 
book and not of reality apart from being only a book. In “A”, Zukofsky posits that books do 
not have a single author, and instead of obscuring that, he uses that multivocality to 
destabilize poetry as a thing purely written. 
 
 
Moving Out 
 
While Zukofsky is certainly an under-discussed poet, his influence has spread through 
certain groups of poets. The qualities which I have surveyed above – particularly his ability 
to push the limits of writing as a communicative tool – are prescient to the loose group of 
radical poets of the late 1970’s associated with L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine. Rather 
than spin the wheels of Zukofsky, I find that it would be more productive at this point to see 
the afterlife of his work, and through a brief look into the Language poets, consider how 
Zukofsky’s writing is amplified as we hear it in its recurrence. 
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Zukofsky’s work, and “A” in particular, have served as a model for the lengthy poetic 
projects of Language poets like Ron Silliman’s The Alphabet, Bernadette Mayer’s Studying 
Hunger, and Hannah Weiner’s The Code Poems. He is also the focus of the conclusion of the 
collected works in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, edited by Bruce Andrews and Charles 
Bernstein, wherein several Language poets pay homage to the influence and complexity of 
Zukofsky’s writing. While Zukofsky poetry is in fact not particularly in keeping with the 
tenants of the Language school, his work represents a distinct approach to poetics that still 
seems to have yielded a similar poetic effect. The primary correlation between Zukofsky and 
this later movement is the mechanics of eliding interpretation through the foregrounding of 
the word over syntagmatic interpretability. “A” is precisely the work that “cannot be 
computed,” as Barthes writes, denying adherence to most models of poetic analysis at the 
time of its publication, advocating that the words of the poem be read as they are. This is not 
a prescriptive advocacy for arriving at one meaning or another, but a compulsion to read the 
words as words on a page and not as referents to sound or other ephemeral phenomena. As 
an example of a shorter work, Zukofsky’s poem “I’s (pronounced eyes)” begins, 
Hi, Kuh 
Those 
gold’n bees 
are I’s, 
eyes, 
skyscrapers. (Complete Short Poetry, 1-6) 
 
While many critics have indicted Zukofsky’s writing as hermetic or intentionally alienating 
to readers, it is more productive to take up a method of reading that views the text as an open 
one. This poem in particular is an instance of a seemingly distant text that only necessitates a 
reading of the word, as word, treating the poem as that “methodological field” outlined by 
Barthes, and not an object which demands sorting. The opening pun that mimics the sound of 
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“haiku” is somewhat of a temptation, for as we may find a productive correlation between the 
invocation of the haiku form and the sparse wording of the poem, we may also consider the 
spelling provided, and recognize the written quality of the poem, not only the sound implied 
(if it is at all) by the aural proximity. The only other readily identifiable prosodic technique 
present here is the rhyming I/eye/sky vowels, a linked progression which marks, as a 
transformation, the movement from subjective self (I) to the isolated act of perception (eye) 
to the field of vision external to the body (skyscraper). Additionally, we can notice that these 
three may rhyme in the plural as well, with the misleading “visual” rhyme of “I’s,” “eyes,” 
“skys,” but since this is not how the word is properly spelled, attention is drawn to the 
discrepancy between written and sounded word, giving a further sense of the material status 
of the poem as a text and not an oral performance. 
This shift in poetic perspective away from the Romantic “I” echoes Barthes’ views of 
the relations between author and Text. His determination that the Text “reads without the 
inscription of the Father,” a status abstractly held by author (or God), the typical filial 
relation to the Text, whose “life is no longer the origin of his fictions but a fiction 
contributing to his work,” disrupts the impulse to revert back to intention as a guide for 
reading (1280). While Barthes maintains that this is an aspect of textuality and not intention, 
Zukofsky actively tries to sublimate the author and intention through a poem that creates 
associations, without relying on the referentiality of Romantic mythology or High Modernist 
intellectual obscurity. This marks a movement from theory into application that would later 
filter into the writing of the Language poets, who would take Barthes’ author-made-character 
and make a disappearing act of it. 
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I believe it is useful to highlight an anecdote from Zukofsky’s biography that 
illustrates this capacity of disintegration in light of the developments of American poetics in 
the wake of Zukofsky’s death in 1978. Mark Scroggins, in The Poem of a Life, gestures 
towards what he identifies as a prophetically symbolic moment at a memorial to the poet 
shortly after his death. At San Francisco State University, poet and friend of Zukofsky, 
Robert Duncan, gave a talk and reading which emphasized the beauty of Zukofsky’s lyricism 
and their personal relationship as a kind of farewell to his late friend. However, the 
subsequent speaker, Language poet, Barrett Watten, took the stage only to begin speaking 
about the irrelevance of Zukofsky as a man, pivoting to discuss both the contradictions in and 
the value of his poetry in purely theoretical and political terms. Duncan’s outrage at the 
insensitivity of such a performance led him to interrupt the poet, and Scroggins claims that 
this marked a clear division in a formerly (quasi)united camp of avant-garde poets for 
decades to come (Scroggins 463-465). These two camps may be understood as the 
sentimental lyricists (Duncan), and the impersonal radicals (Watten and the Language poets). 
This anecdote of the purely analytic and critical reading of a hero like Zukofsky is 
useful in considering the Language poets as being even more distinctly removed from the 
tradition characterized by the Romantics, carried through Eliot, and even, perhaps 
unwittingly, perpetuated by those belonging to the New York School and the Beats. 
Eschewing that “I” that Virginia Woolf identifies looming in the background of all singularly 
male texts, the Language poets were responsible for a turn away from what Lee Bartlett calls 
“the Wordsworthian sense of the poem’s task—to recall through a fixed and definable 
identity a moment in time and space” (744-745). Turning now, then, to some examples of 
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this movement we may begin to conceptualize how the Language Poets began pulling at the 
thread between text and society, only to stitch them back in reverse. 
It should be stated clearly that the categories that grouped the Language poets 
together were not so much aesthetic as philosophical and political. As Scroggins notes of the 
generational gap between writers like Duncan and those like Watten, the younger generation 
were not the sentimental artist-type, but instead a group of mostly highly politically-active 
Marxists trained in the then-burgeoning field of poststructuralism, as well as studying, like 
Bernstein did, analytic philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein. This represents a certain shift 
in background for the class of writers, who considered themselves as much critics as they did 
poets, and so there was no need to differentiate between the textual byproducts of each 
occupation. 
In the preface to The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, “Repossessing the Word,” 
editors Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein write as a mission statement, “we have 
emphasized a spectrum of writing that places its attention primarily on language and ways of 
making meaning, that takes for granted neither vocabulary, grammar, process, shape, syntax, 
program, or subject matter. All of these remain at issue,” an going on to emphasize that one 
overarching goal of the movement has been to “generate discussion on the relation of writing 
to politics, particularly to articulate some of the ways that writing can act to critique society” 
(iv-v). While these motives are, perhaps intentionally, broad, they do indicate a radical shift 
in the desire to politicize poetry through a renewed attention to the nuances and potential 
horizons of writing when one is dedicated to the construction of the language itself more so 
than its ability to accurately communicate thought . 
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For all of Barthes’s understanding of reading/writing, the materiality of the text does 
not physically shift; in a typical poststructuralist move we might say that it does, but 
Barthes’s assertion conflates perception with embodiment. But what the Language poets 
were responsible for was not only producing new kinds of texts which demanded a different 
way of reading than poems before, but creating new ways of writing as an affirmation of the 
boundless possibilities of human language, and beyond that to the potential for using that 
language to shape new political realities. The implication of this mindset is the reinvigorated 
responsibility on the part of the poet; it is not enough to liberate reading practices as long as 
literary production remains constrained by traditions of literary markets. 
Jed Rasula, in his essay “Statement on Reading in Writing,” flips the model of 
reading/writing discussed by Barthes to address writers, first-and-foremost, as readers. He 
argues that the only real writers are those like Stephen King, with a market that is already 
waiting for any work he produces, for “[w]riters without such an immediate market are in the 
damning circumstance, more often than not, of trying to insist on themselves as not readers, 
against all odds, in service of the fetish of originality” (52). However, if one is to resist this 
fetish that a writer like Johnson in ARK claims of some pure creative spirit “is to pronounce 
oneself willing to work with other people” (52). Zukofsky is a powerful precursor to this idea 
as a writer who, despite being the only name on the spine of the book, is in constant 
conversation with other writers and thinkers. 
A pivotal departure in the development of the Language school comes from poet 
Robert Grenier, who in the first issue of the little magazine This, published in 1971, wrote a 
piece consisting only of the line, “I HATE SPEECH.” This is an apt illustration of the 
charged nature of much of the group’s collective work, the negative celebration of the written 
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word over the “poetic voice” that dominated the lyrical tradition for so long. The lack of any 
traditionally formal poetic techniques in this statement put that much more emphasis on a 
contradictory tension to condemn the thing to which writing refers. The Language poets’ 
vital attention to the categories of the sentence and the word does not necessarily invite a 
traditional formalist reading, which would ignore the significance of the role of process, 
becoming and chance in the poetry of this movement. Furthermore, it would be antithetical to 
the thrust of this analysis to claim a definitive interpretation of a text, let alone that of a 
Language poem. In turn, I wish only to provide a reading (writing) of two poems by Charles 
Bernstein as they contribute to further consideration of the poetic turn away from the subject 
to the writing itself which seeks to reach out from its isolation. 
Bernstein’s poem “As If the Trees By Their Very Roots Had Hold of Us,” from his 
early collection, Senses of Responsibility, works as a wonderful case study for the meta- 
prosodic concerns of the Language school. It begins, 
Strange to remember a visit, really not so 
Long ago, which now seems, finally, past. Always, it’s a 
Kind of obvious thing I guess, amazed by that 
Cycle: that first you anticipate a thing & it seems 
Far off (qtd. in Senses of Respsonsibility 1-5) 
 
The enjambment of “that” and “Cycle” is, in a certain light, a meta-prosodic statement on the 
function of enjambment as a turning from one line to the next; a fundamental reading of a 
rather fundamental poetic technique. But if we consider the Language movement’s desire to 
emphasize, over the traditional line, the sentence as the emblem of ordinary speech, then 
such an enjambment might represent an ironic poetic disruption of ordinary speech in favor 
of a fabricated, bourgeois form of poetic division, where traditions of length dictate structure 
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and not the language itself as a self-contradictory instance of how the artificial aspect of the 
line disrupts that ordinary speech. 
As an extension of the earlier discussion of Zukofsky’s going beyond the authorial 
decentering outlined by Barthes, it is important to note the uncertain role of the subject in this 
poem. The three uses of the first-person pronoun “I” (there is no “me” in this poem) in this 
poem are all paired with indicators of uncertainty: “I guess,” “I’m no longer sure,” “What 
can I say here?” The author of the poem has not only removed himself a good deal by turning 
the attention to our predicament but, more importantly, has interrogated his own authority in 
the presentation of the thing. Any statement that stems from the typical subjective authority 
of “I” has folded itself back into the mix of uncertainty and confusion that permeates the 
whole of the poem. 
There is also the constant awareness of becoming in the poem: all that is given at face-value 
is the invocation of process, rife with subtle contradictions. The resolution of “Always” in the 
second line is immediately followed by the uncertainty of “a kind of obvious thing I guess” 
in the next. This in-betweenness, the sensation of never having arrived results in a fully- 
abstracted, physical body, where we are “Eternally buzzing over the time, / Unable to live in 
it…,” in a world where, 
Hope, which is, after all, no more than a splint of thought 
Projected outwards, “looking to catch” somewhere – 
What can I say here? – that the ease or 
Difficulty of such memories doesn’t preclude 
“That harsher necessity” of going on always in 
A new place, under different circumstances: 
& yet we don’t seem to have changed 
 
This feeling of having lost something that perhaps was never obtained, be it a material desire, 
 
or the desire to communicate through language, is characterized as a “slipping away / ‘Like 
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the sand through your fingers in an old movie,’” (8-9). By placing this line in quotations, it 
implies a status of reference, but at the same time, it refers to nothing other than the sort of 
nostalgia one would expect to be pulled from an old noir film. In this example, it is evident 
that it is less the actuality of a citation that is significant than the gesture to a citation. In a 
sense, this is the manner of introspection called for by Andrews and Bernstein, where reality 
of reference becomes secondary to the act of referencing, for the effect is no less nostalgic. 
The poem concludes, 
So, more of these tracings, as if by some magic 
Of the phonetic properties of these squiggles… Or 
Does that only mystify the “power” of “presence” which 
Is, as well, a sort of postponement (45-48) 
 
This final line is emblematic of an important correlation between Barthes and Bernstein’s 
poem on the whole, in that its process “The Text… practices the infinite deferment of the 
signified, is dilatory; its field is that of the signifier” (Barthes 1279). This deferral, this 
“postponement”, is the longing to achieve a unity between “these squiggles” and the “power 
of presence” that would allow the individual or the community to take the temporal or 
physical planes, and finally live within them. But alas, the act of reading and (re)writing this 
text positions places the reader in that same state of placelessness in language. Barthes writes 
that The Text “is without closure” (1279), though instead of reading into a hopeless future, 
one may choose to take up the real political cause from which the poem arises, a sense of 
externally determined and perpetrated loss, and continue the attempt to grapple with the 
potentials of language to finally create that unity, or approach it, through a passionate love 
for the language and its ability to reaffirm one’s own agency. But this idealist unity also runs 
the risk of closing the text off from its exterior, which is principally antithetical to Barthes’ 
“methodological field” or the conception of the text as rhizomatic. 
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As a final example I turn to another Bernstein poem that is exemplary of a different side of 
the Language poem, in which it is not so much the ambiguity of images that challenges the 
reader, but the way in which it seems to speak out directly about itself, a poem with no 
content other than its own unfolding description. The poem comes from the conclusion to an 
experimental essay derived from a series of listserv posts made by Bernstein, and in it, he 
takes this concept of the line as his subject, 
This line is stripped of emotion. 
This line is no more than an 
illustration of a European 
theory. This line is bereft 
of a subject. This line 
has no reference apart 
from its context in 
this line. This line 
is only about itself. 
This line has no meaning: its words are imaginary, its 
sounds inaudible… 
This line refuses reality. (qtd. in “Community and the Individual Talent”)8 
 
For all the criticism of the unreadability of Language Poets (which Zukofsky also received), 
Bernstein’s poem comes across as rather obvious: the uselessness of the writing act. It seems 
to clearly implore us to understand that we are not reading what we are reading. We may in 
fact take the poem at its face and conclude it to be nothing more than a product of French 
theory, perhaps of Barthes’ theories, specifically. That, first of all, his “lines” are not 
contained to one line, and are enjambed, is an indication of the privileging of the sentence, or 
a unit of ordinary speech, and upends any sense of certainty in the text due to this conflated 
terminology. Secondly, the implication that each “This line” indicates an autonomous line, 
produces the possibility that while “this line” might be “stripped of emotion,” “this (next) 
line” might not be. Even within a potentially homogenous or repetitive poem, Bernstein takes 
 
8 This poem was later published as “Thank You For Saying You’re Welcome” in Near/Miss (2018). 
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as his subject the problems inherent to writing itself, these issues that must first be taken up 
on the grounds of language since it in turn is the mechanism by which reality is shaped. This 
is the main issue at stake for the Language poets: the entwined relationship between a 
language that dictates to a certain degree the material conditions of life and the practitioners 
of that language who are responsible for shaking loose from engrained forms of 
communicating through interrogation and experimentation with those forms. These are not 
simply poems about poetry, but poems that take on the burden of delineating new ways of 
being and engaging head on against established regimes of signs. 
But despite his metaprosodic commentary, Bernstein, and by extension many other 
poets of the Language movement, are subject to a critique of serious consequences when 
certain poetic methods are taken to their logical end. There is certainly a value to the 
problematizing of the author-function in poetry, but what about when this perspective is 
applied to all authors? The result is a devaluing of author subjectivity, as well as subjectivity 
writ broad, when the idea of textualization overtakes the real world. There are perspectives 
outside of white American and European intellectuals that have much more to lose in their 
erasure. 
In her essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, Gayatri Spivak addresses this issue in the 
work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as well as Michel Foucault. Spivak validly 
charges the three thinkers with ignoring the real, material conditions of certain forms of 
oppression through the purely theoretical and idealistic frameworks they apply in their work. 
Responding to their notion of using theory like a “tool box,” Spivak writes “Considering that 
the verbalism of the theoretical world and its access to any world defined against it as 
'practical' is irreducible, such a declaration helps only the intellectual anxious to prove that 
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intellectual labor is just like manual labor” (70). Her identification of this conflation of two 
distinct kinds of labor (though this is not to deny the labor of intellectual work, only its 
important distinction) highlights an issue inherent to much of the theory of which Deleuze 
and Guattari are characteristic: the oversimplification of highly diverse conditions of labor 
and identity across the globe. This is symptomatic of the Marxist homogenization of all 
forms of labor into the proletariat, when in reality the variance across working and living 
conditions in different parts of the world are vast. 
The same critique may be levied against the Language poets. Their brand of 
impenetrably difficult poetry, in which all concerns are made secondary to that of language, 
including identity, is eerily similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s privileging of the text over the 
body and their tendency to homogenous difference in very attempt to uphold and celebrate it. 
The discussion of Bernstein’s poetry and the uncertainty of its “I” figure is all good and well, 
until the same principle is applied to a poet who has very invested stakes in the message of 
their “I”. The two cannot be the same; it is one thing to advocate for one’s own textual 
disappearance (though we know this always stems from textual authority anyway), but in the 
polemic tendencies of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E there is the air of broad advocacy for their 
concepts, almost characteristic of a manifesto. This ignores writers producing work in very 
different conditions, writers who may already be in danger of having lost the ability to speak 
in the first-person, which is of course the primary concern of Spivak’s essay. 
While I agree with Spivak’s critique of Deleuze and Guattari for their tendency to 
make ephemeral certain real, material conditions, it is nonetheless somewhat ironic 
considering that the two had attempted to articulate a similar critique, but of texts, in A 
Thousand Plateaus, as a part of the chapter “On Several Regimes of Signs.” This is not to 
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say that her critique is misinformed, but in fact reinforces her criticisms because Deleuze and 
Guattari choose to focus on the textual sign as the one of priority. Nevertheless, their analysis 
of the sign is significant for its identification of the oppressive capabilities of texts, as well as 
the replacement of the God-like figure of authority with the text that functions as God: 
It is now the book, the most deterritorialized of things, that fixes territories and 
genealogies. The latter are what the books says, and the former the place at which the 
book is said. The function of interpretation has totally changed. Or it disappears 
entirely in favor of a pure and literal recitation forbidding the slightest change, 
addition, or commentary. (Deleuze and Guattari 127) 
Like any conversation on the relationship between theory and praxis, there are contradictions. 
For the Language poets, it seems that the attempt to embody the theory in their poetry in 
order to create a truly political and revolutionary poetics at the same time renders their work 
myopic to their own prerequisite of social function, as theory-in-writing is not the same as an 
actual enactment of political principles. In turn, their work suffers many of the same pitfalls 
as that which they sought to overturn. The disavowal of authority intended through 
displacing the author-figure can only ever stem from a certain authority to begin with, and 
therefore self-displacement in the text remains a power-move. It aligns with the sort of book 
that Deleuze and Guattari warn us against, “The unique book, the total work, all possible 
combinations inside the book, the tree-book, the cosmos-book: all of these platitudes so dear 
to the avant-gardes, which cur the book off from its relations with the outside, are even worse 
than the chant of the signifier” (127). Furthermore, their critique, while made toward writing 
in general, is most fitting to the poetic text with its lyric quality, for they argue that there “is 
no longer a signifier-signified relation, but a subject of enunciation issuing from the point of 
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subjectification and a subject of the statement in a determinable relation to the first subject.” 
This emphasis on the subject and their enunciation is characteristic of the poetic text and 
aligns this kind of text with divine enunciation found in Genesis. The poetic attempt to 
relinquish control and authority over one’s own text actually renders the poet as authoritative 
as the word-thing made real upon God’s own enunciation to let there be light. 
Language writing, despite its theoretical issues, seems to be, above all, trying to 
create this “outside of language” by grounding itself in the sole focus of language. The 
aforementioned tendencies of Language poetry, as exemplified in Bernstein’s “As If the 
Trees by Their Very Roots Had Hold of Us,” can be considered along the lines set out by 
Deleuze above. When we consider the gesture toward intertextuality in the line “Like the 
sand through your fingers in an old movie,” as not-quite-citation, we may understand how 
Bernstein is performing a kind of escape-work which seeks to reach toward a nostalgia 
outside of itself. Whether this “quotation” refers to anything concrete, it is the reaching that 
is of most significance. This reaching, along with the repeated language of uncertainty, 
resonates with Deleuze’s notion of language and writing as always in a state of becoming. In 
turn, the poem should not be read as a lament of the condition of textuality, but as a single 
temporal cross-section which illustrates that break from a language which falsely proclaims 
itself as having arrived. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
So how does “A”-24 escape itself? The closing to the final scene poses the question 
of “Whose voice shall I use now that I am near yours?” (803, D). That the poet considers 
relinquishing his voice for another’s is hopeful enough, this willingness to remove oneself 
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from the center of one’s own creative endeavor in order to let the work breathe. As a final 
comparison I turn to what I see as the work which seems to take Zukofsky’s practice and 
push it to its furthest reaches. 
Tan Lin’s 7 Controlled Vocabularies and Obituary 2004: The Joys of Cooking is a 
self-described “ambient work.” Its sub-subtitle, “[AIRPORT NOVEL MUSICAL POEM 
PAINTING FILM PHOTO HALLUCINATION LANDSCAPE]” is a telling description of 
the ambiguity in labeling the work, but its significance to this discussion rests in Lin’s ability 
to create a text which speaks about itself so candidly while simultaneously performing the 
very concepts it postulates. Throughout the entire book there are claims that, “Poetry 
should…” “Poetry is…”, etc. In an interview on Charles Bernstein’s radio show, Close 
Listening, Lin expressed the desire to create a “reading environment” of generalities, citing 
Gertrude Stein’s Making of Americans as an earlier model of a text which resists reading for 
detail, an opinion further expressed by Paul Stephens in The Poetics of Information 
Overload.9 
What Lin’s work contributes to this discussion is an extended model of the reading 
practices exemplified by Zukofsky’s writing. “A”-24, although not quite airport or landscape, 
occupies the mediums of drama, prose, criticism, poetry, and music, disintegrating into a 
kind of ambient field of poetics. At the end of the first section of Lin’s book, he describes 
this field, 
How to incite the idea of reading without reading? How to accessorize reading as a 
practice similar to entertaining? One comes and then one goes. One adds something 
and then one subtracts something. 
 
 
 
9 Stephens advocates for “reading at” Stein’s novel, as opposed to “reading through.” Without an official 
recording of “A”-24, I would say that “reading at” it may be the only possible method, as I only have one set of 
eyes. 
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The most precious commodity in modern life is time. I live in a house like a series of 
loops, plus signs 
 
+  - (7 Controlled Vocabularies 38) 
 
Here, Lin postulates a reading experience that is significant for its generality. The cyclicality 
of coming and going, adding and subtracting, is powerful because it is general, not occluding 
readers through specificity. He constructs, and calls for, a poetic system that retreats from 
author or intention. Lin’s work exhibits a kind of Bakhtinian centrifugal quality, echoing 
Calvino assertion that “Even if a work’s overall design has been meticulously planned, what 
counts is not its enclosure within a harmonious shape but rather the centrifugal force it 
releases, with its multiplicity of languages as guarantee of a truth that isn’t partial” (143). 
When Lin writes that the “most beautiful book would be a 1:1 scale model of itself and 
divided into / Front / Back / Like a Diary of Someone I Know,” he simultaneously invokes the 
specificity of an exact replica, the subjective, personal nature of the diary, but obscured by 
the generality of “Someone I Know” (Lin 106). 
Ronald Johnson’s ARK, and the claims made by the author about the work, may be 
situated symmetrically with a poet like Lin. Johnson’s desire to “start over” and create in a 
pure, unadulterated sense Lin shows in 7 Controlled Vocabularies that he remains 
uninterested in the production of a poetic text that upholds any Romantic notions of creativity 
or artistic production. Instead, Lin seeks to create an environment of reading, what I would 
term a poetic field, wherein poetry as a distinguished art form ceases to be as such. This may 
be a troubling concept to some, that of a poetry which is indistinguishable from furniture or 
newspapers, but far from diminishing its value, it would bring poetry into our everyday lives. 
I find this to be far less pompous than Pop-Art conceptions of the elevating the everyday 
object to the status of high-art, which privileges art as somehow better than the quotidian. 
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Rather, this brings poetry out of a lofty realm of difficult interpretation and into Deleuze’s 
notion of the “social field of engagement.” 
Johnson, a poet whose work I admire greatly, seems to cling to a tradition of poets 
asserting themselves, in a Bloomian sense, within a canon of older poets, a canon which is, in 
turn, intent on asserting itself through time moving forward. This is a desire to be 
remembered, to have one’s work last through time when one is no longer present. But I find 
Lin’s assertion that poetry is most beautiful when it is forgotten far, far less egotistical. 
Whether one agrees or not with Lin’s proclamations, I do not read them as over- 
intellectualizing the art of poetry, as it is surprising the extent to which Lin is concerned with 
beauty, and in many ways, 7 Controlled Vocabularies almost seems to resemble late 19th 
century writing on art, in the spirit of someone like John Ruskin. Lin’s emphasis on 
remembering and forgetting is a diptych I would correlate to my prior occupation with 
Zukofsky’s integration and disintegration. He writes that “[a]s anyone who has ever read a 
painting will tell you, paintings, like poems, are most beautiful [and least egotistical] at the 
exact moment in which they are forgotten, like disco” (Lin 22). This project has been mainly 
concerned with how historical material constituted Zukofsky’s poetic production as a force of 
memory and absorption, but the most beautiful and compelling effect of Zukofsky’s poetry is 
the way he constructs these systems of historical images and writing to signal to the reader 
that we have forgotten these things, like disco. 
This division of a remembering-self and a forgetting-self calls to mind Jorge Luis 
Borges’ story “Borges and I,” in which the author grapples with distinguishing between 
himself and his author-function, 
I shall remain in Borges, not in myself (if it is true that I am someone), but I 
recognize myself less in his books than in many others or in the laborious strumming 
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of a guitar. Years ago I tried to free myself from him and went from the mythologies 
of the suburbs to the games with time and infinity, but those games belong to Borges 
now and I shall have to imagine other things. Thus my life is a flight and I lose 
everything and everything belongs to oblivion, or to him. 
 
I do not know which of us has written this page. 
Collected Fictions, p. 324 
 
The displacement of recognition, where he recognizes himself most in the strumming of a 
guitar is a salient image for the dispersal of the self through writing and reading. And 
although Borges’ story takes on a melancholy tone regarding loss, it may also illustrate the 
complete dissolution of one’s self in the world around. A reading of poetics which seeks to 
avoid the dangers of ignoring the real world in favor of the purely textual necessitates 
continued connection to and engagement with reality. Far from trivializing the poetic, this 
kind of consideration helps to make relevant the effects of poetic texts as works that can 
effectively speak to material conditions, not only intellectual ones, as materially conditioned 
phenomena. They may no longer deny their own reality, their own complicity, and, by 
extension, the very real effect they can play on the language we use to communicate, create, 
and resist. In the introduction to this project I aligned what Zukofsky fashioned in “A” as 
similar to what Walter Benjamin sought to create with Passagenwerk, what Benjamin 
referred to in a 1930 letter as “the theatre of all my struggles and all my ideas.” But more 
than a theatre, or a dreaming city, what Zukofsky has done is build a house and open the 
windows, letting in or out what will. 
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Coda 
 
“unhated unloved unseen”: Looking Beyond “A” 
 
To this point, the concerns of this project have been more or less centered solely on 
Louis Zukofsky’s “A”. However, in a poem of epic scope, in terms of genre and general 
length, huge philosophical and artistic concerns may be expected. Additionally, when a work 
is so sustained, there is room to explore such massive epistemological and ontological 
concerns. Zukofsky spent close to half of a century producing “A”, what he called his “poem 
of a life,” and so there are other concepts in the poem that could be explored along similar 
lines as I have pursued, but was not able to address for reasons of scale. For instance, despite 
the number of passages concerned with plants and animals, they have received little attention 
and there are no ecocritical or animal studies-based readings of Zukofsky available currently. 
The last two projects of Zukofsky’s life are, formally speaking, antithetical to the 
range of form(s) employed in “A”. But what I would like to acknowledge here are the 
currents that run through both, that Zukofsky is able to perform a similar kind of poetic 
without the space available in an 800-page poem. 80 Flowers was the last completed work 
that Zukofsky produced in his lifetime, and consists of eighty poems (eighty-one with the 
preface), each dedicated to a different flower, most of which were present in the garden kept 
by Celia Zukofsky. The poems all follow the same structure: eights lines, five words per line. 
The five-word line seems to be the form Zukofsky developed most throughout the later 
period of his writing, and 80 Flowers is an interesting case in that it takes the line structure 
that Zukofsky used in his most sprawling sections of “A”, movements 21-23, and reigns 
them in to only eight lines. 
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Structurally-speaking, we may see this as a natural progression of Zukofsky’s practice 
of concision. Unlike the grand, historical themes of “A”, 80 Flowers details what is more-or- 
less a simple domestic backdrop. It makes poetry from a rather unexciting scene: the 
backyard of the poet’s home, taking the scope of world history in “A” to an exploration of 
the history and interconnectivity of plant life. Michele J. Leggott’s insightful book, Reading 
80 Flowers, is the most extensive study of Zukofsky’s later poetics, and covers every flower 
in the collection, cross-referencing allusions and biographical relevance. Leggott even 
incorporates to some extent the themes of “A” into her reading of the last collection. 
In turn, I find it fitting to conclude by extending the discussion outside of “A” and 
looking at the last poems of Zukofsky’s life-writing, in order to consider how these themes of 
integration and disintegration function in poetry that is not as entangled as “A”. This should 
serve as a provocation for further scholarship on Zukofsky’s writing, a necessity that has not 
been pursued actively in recent years. As one final reading, I turn to the image of the 
perennial succulent I addressed first in Chapter I’s reading of “A”-22: “Liveforever,” 
Wild time liveforever horsethyme ice 
by shard green red-purple thyrse 
shadowed stone or a flurry 
troth orpine kin acre yellow-red 
mossy stonecrop love-entangle your kind’s 
roof houseleek old-man-and-woman who woo 
thatch song quicksilver cold would 
won’t know All sedum no 
(Complete Short Poetry 326) 
 
This particular plant is especially important to Zukofsky and his writing, and occurs as an 
image throughout “A” in “A”-1, 2, 7, 12, 15, 22, and 23, what Leggott refers to as “an 
engagement with time past” (Leggott 144). The inclusion of “Liveforever” as an entry in 80 
Flowers offers another instance of Zukofsky recycling themes across works. If “A” is a 
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model of recurrence, where the same names and images keeping coming back again and 
again, then “Liveforever” has subsumed all every instance of that image and contained in 
within a very brief poem. This recalls Zukofsky’s aim for showing the story in every word so 
that we can read “A” within 80 Flowers. 
This poem, despite its brevity, exhibits almost all of the qualities present in the larger 
passages of “A”. There is the punning of “time” with “thyme,” as well as the addition of 
“roof” in front of “houseleek,” which is another common name for liveforever. There is a 
tension drawn between written word and spoken word, a kind of a visual rhyme, in the 
juxtaposition of Cold/would and who/woo, which highlights a staggered musical quality, 
particularly in the latter example, where the sounding out of “woo” after “who” feels almost 
unnatural given the proximity of their sounds. The poem seems to mimic the partiality of the 
image “ice / by shard,” signaling its own disjunction while also demonstrating its capacity to 
include, which Charles Bernstein would describe as belonging to “a poetics of assimilation 
and accommodation” (Pitch of Poetry 296). 
Overall, the paratactic methods employed by Zukofsky are the defining feature of his 
poetry in which there is no cohesive sentence, let alone a narrative or clear scene. It calls 
back to Ezra Pound’s ideogrammic method, best exemplified by his poem “In a Station of the 
Metro”: “The apparition of these faces in the crowd; / Petals on a wet, black bough” (New 
Selected Poems and Translations). But whereas Pound enacts a disjunction between two 
rather simple images which spurs the sense of ambiguity, Zukofsky disrupts at almost every 
single word. There is little-to-no sense of syntactic continuity, and instead the result is less a 
poem than it is a list. However, as Bernstein argues in his lecture “Before Time: for David 
Antin,” this parataxis is what returns a sense of presence to the scene without allowing the 
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strict, forced trajectory of plot to rob the work of its now-time. By instead structuring the 
poem through a collage of combined colors, alternate common names, and syntactic knots, 
Zukofsky produces a work that seems, by virtue of its condensed form, geared toward a 
reading that follows the model of the poem’s construction: nonlinear, associative, and 
hypertextual. 
What remains to be addressed would be, first, the survey of the themes of field 
poetics throughout the entirety of “A”, as no book-length work since Barry Ahearn’s has 
approached the poem as a whole. Even a critical edition of “A” is unavailable and would be 
necessary for opening up broader study of the poet. Furthermore, I believe it would be more 
productive to consider Zukofsky alongside poets and artists working after him, rather than 
continuing to feed a fed horse and compare him only with the predecessors Pound and 
Williams. While this work was productive and insightful, it remains a too-common approach 
to the reading Zukofsky’s work, and it would be invaluable work to poetic study to examine, 
hear how Zukofsky’s work, its afterlives, recur throughout contemporary poetic work. 
As it stands, the mid-1990’s served as the critical peak for Zukofsky studies, with the 
work of those such as Bob Perelman. And while every now and then a chapter on Zukofsky 
creeps into a book, I believe that the current American landscape provides an important angle 
for reading Zukofsky in the Internet age. When “historical and contemporary particulars” 
come under attack from the very top of our society, it makes more sense than ever for 
scholars in the field of poetics to address how our literatures have dealt with the erasure of 
history in the past, when thinkers like Walter Benjamin produced their most desperate work 
in the face of real political violence. Up until now, Zukofsky has been treated as somewhat of 
an esoteric writer divorced from the real world, a writer of l’art pour l’art, but I believe that 
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his perspective and artistic output offer timely meditations on the importance of remembering 
and keeping history alive. 
While my proposition of the concept of escape-work stems from the intellectual 
sources of French post-structuralism, and the discussion of absorption in the previous chapter 
is grounded in the study of poetics, I would like to consider further how it may be relevant 
today in a world where borders have become increasingly impermeable and national 
identities become more and more resistant to accommodating difference. Perhaps in reading 
works that take as their concern physical movement and cloaking would provide productive 
sources for refining this concept so that it may apply outside of a purely theoretical realm. 
There are productive possibilities to work that operates along the lines of Bernstein’s 
proposed approach in “The Pataquerical Imagination,” what he proposes as “bent studies,” 
which includes the study of ambience (as I discussed in the work of Tan Lin), idiolect, nude 
formalisms (distressed metrics), modularity, and musical-poetic crosspollination (Pitch of 
Poetry 298-99). By conceiving of radically new means of reading poetry against the grain of 
traditional – though still valuable – prosodic study, there is an exorbitant amount of work to 
be done in studying the likes of Zukofsky, Lin, and other more recent poets that may 
engender wildly new realizations about the way that poetry and poetic language connect to 
the world outside of the book. 
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Appendix 
 
Some Textual Examples 
 
 
“A”-22 excerpt 
 
Late later and much later 
surge sea erupts boiling molten 
lava island from ice, land 
seen into color thru day 
and night: voiced, once unheard 
earth beginning idola of years 
that love well forget late. 
History’s best emptied of names’ 
impertinence met on the ways: 
shows then the little earth 
at regard of the heavens 
unfolding tract and flying congregate 
birds their hiding valentine’s day: 
little horse can you speak 
won’t know till it speaks: 
three birches in the meadow 
kiss: constant please. Attentive as 
good: no prophet no footnote: 
earliest mountain the lowest the 
seas moil, thin earth crust 
resists less, thickened thrown highest; 
stone, coral time evoke chitin’s— 
word time a voice bridled 
as order, what is eternal 
is living, a tree’s growing 
body’s actual shadow in light. 
Figured 135,000 years built up 
from 75 foot depth the 
coast gained from the sea— 
upheaval subsided or still gaining— 
colder currents south, warmer north: 
conjecture not for the ganoid 
or monkey dropped from branch’s 
perch – breccia – tumulus skull fished. 
Cave, moraine – in peat moss 
layers lie tree trunks, red 
pine called fir, oak above 
or beech; higher – alder, hazel, 
birch sinking, aspen indifferently everywhere. (“A” 511-512) 
Rowe 128 
 
“A”-23 excerpt 
 
Ye nó we see hay 
io we hay we see 
hay io we sée no 
we see knee (windsong bis) 
we knee we see hay 
io we hay we see 
hay io we see knee 
hay io wé see knee 
hay io we hów we 
see hay io we see, 
no wee knee no wa–. 
Akin jabber too hot to 
rail all but cheek a 
hard game clambers treed, cliff 
for honey has she danced 
ahead there, pipes and flute, 
let her dance ahead (5-year 
planner plans a wife, nose 
whose now he knows) papyrus 
jungle sandhill splayed-wedge wader damsel 
crane: or sun hot bright 
turn home slowed yellow horse 
or cold with fear the 
need turned small sing itself 
font of old white cloud 
and men grown flower plough 
empowers how soon their senate 
night debate proves mixed blessing 
to a wife up late 
child’s tears years o la 
la lu, rocked raring horses 
sue myrrh holy leazing golden 
tile. Praise! gill . . gam . . mesh . . (“A” 539-540)_ 
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“A”-21 excerpt 
 
(Voice off) 
When Plautus lay dead Comedy wept 
an empty scene, laughs, lewd mimes, jokes hushed, 
innumerable simultaneous numbers clamoring around 
Tragedy voicing the dead smile undivined good – 
 
Old friends 
when I was young 
you laughed with my tongue 
but when I sang 
for forty years 
you hid in your ears 
hardly a greeting 
 
I was 
being poor 
termed difficult 
tho I attracted a cult 
of leeches 
and they signed love 
and drank its cordials 
always for giving 
when they were receiving 
they presumed 
an infinite forgiveness 
 
With my weak eyes 
I did not see 
assumed a bit 
of infinite myself 
arrogating hypocrisy 
to no heart 
but stupidity 
 
O it was 
better better 
than equating favors 
a few to my balance 
years later 
charged as 
cantankerous 
in their senile scrounging 
getting on 
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And tho love starve 
carved mostly bones 
(not those young friends 
put to good use) 
if I’m not dead 
a dead mask smiles 
to all old friends 
still young where else 
it says take care 
prosper 
without my tongue 
only your own (“A” 499-500) 
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